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Copyright and Public Welfare in Global
Perspective
RUTH GANA OKEDIJI"
INTRODUCTION
Globalization' has moved copyright to the center stage of international
economic policy. Most scholars agree that a distinction between
internationalization2 and globalization is that the latter is impelled by the
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law. I am grateful to Mark
Lemley, Jerome Reichman, Patricia Vail and David Fidler for helpful comments on an earlier draft, and to
David Jordan for excellent research assistance. I am most grateful to my husband, Dr. Tade Okediji, for
being a patient tutor of economic modeling and for his faithful support. This Article is dedicated to the
memory of H. Leroy Vail, Professor of History, Harvard University, my teacher, mentor, and friend.
1. In this Article, globalization refers to a process involving multiple levels of supranational social,
economic, and political transactions. Individuals or corporate entities who exercise ownership over a
variety of resources and who enjoy unprecedented technological ability to operate across territorial
boundaries largely determine the impact of this process. The result is an ascendancy of private
decisionmaking, replacing sovereign prerogative with corporate initiative, in a worldwide economy. In
contrast to its antecedent, "internationalization," globalization dispenses with the centrality of national
sovereignty as a requisite constituent of its legitimacy, and with any notion of obligatory political process
as fuel for its sustained momentum. The absence of a core global actor exercising political power to achieve
strategically identified ends is a standard feature of most attempts to explain the phenomena of
globalization. At the very least, globalization is a process that affects all aspects of social, political, and
economic activity. Each category is affected directly, indirectly, and differently.
2. Internationalization depended on States exercising political will for multilateral strategic economic
and military alliances. The concept of Statehood was fundamental to the international order. The State was
recognized as the principal bearer of rights and duties; the only legitimate agent for the use of force and the
source of order in the international system. The legitimacy of international law derived from adherence to
these axioms. See DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER: FROM THE MODERN STATE TO
COSMOPOLITAN GOVERNANCE 75-76 (1995). The centrality of States, and Statehood, was evidenced in the
last half century by the dominant role of international organizations that, with the mandate of sovereign
States, exercised regulatory authority over vital areas of common concern such as international security,
finance, and trade. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. I, para. 3 (The purposes of the United Nations are "[t]o
achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or
humanitarian character."); Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS--RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) ("The WTO shall
provide the common institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations among its members.");
Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39,
as amended by 20 U.S.T. 2775 (1968), 29 U.S.T.2203 (1976) and T.I.A.S. No. 11898 (1990) ("The
purposes of the International Monetary Fund are.., to promote international monetary cooperation through
a permanent institution, which provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration on international
monetary problems.").
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exponential increase in flows of information across national boundaries
occasioned by information technology. If the international era was
characterized by the liberalization of trade in goods and multilateral
cooperation achieved through national and supranational political processes,
globalization is denoted almost singularly by its minimization of the role and
importance of territorial boundaries and the resulting implications for
sovereignty.' Globalization thrives on the ascendancy of information as the
subject of, and the agency for, socioeconomic activity worldwide. In sum,
information and information technology constitute the centripetal forces of
globalization.
Intellectual property law, specifically copyright law, effectuates the
exercise of sovereignty over information.' Copyright law determines
3. A case may be made for distinguishing between implications for sovereignty that flow from the
exercise of treaty making between States, and those implications that result from the rapid spread of
information and its associated technologies such as the Internet. With respect to the latter, a burgeoning
body of scholarship has examined the implications of globalization for traditional notions of sovereignty.
See, e.g., David R. Johnson & David Post Lmv and Borders-The Rise of Lav in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 1367 (1996); Keith Aoki, Considering Multiple and Overlapping Sovereignties: Liberalism,
Libertarianism, National Sovereignty, "Global" Intellectual Property, and the Internet, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 443 (1998); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internet as a Threat to Sovereignty? Thoughts on the
Internet's Role in Strengthening National and Global Governance, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 423
(1998); see also generally ROBERT J. HOLTON, GLOBALIZATION AND THE NATION-STATE (1998). As to
the former, limitations on sovereignty are the sine qua non or opportunity cost of international treaties. For
example, in their article, Bargaining Around the TRIPs Agreement: The Case for Ongoing Public-Private
Initiatives to Facilitate World Wide Intellectual Property Transactions, Professors J.H. Reichman and
David Lange use the term "residual sovereignty" in their description of limitations on a State's power to
maneuver within the confines of obligations under the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property. See 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 11, 22 (1998). Other scholars note with concern the
domestic ramifications of a State's voluntary and self-imposed limitation on its sovereignty in the name of
globalization. See Sara Dillon, Fuji-Kodak, the WTO, and the Death ofDomestic Political Constituencies,
8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 197, 197-204 (1999) (defining sovereignty to include a nation's capacity to
respond to democratic inputs from domestic constituencies and criticizing the "fictional" hierarchy of WTO
law over national legislation as a fundamental flaw in the WTO adjudicative process). Dillon argues that
"[miodern judicial systems must, under any democratic theory, rest on a basis of complex legislation
derived from competing social inputs. Since the WTO lacks such a basis, it is at best a partial, and at worst
a fraudulent, judicial system." See id. at 248; see also W.R. Cornish, Judicial Legislation, in LAW,
SOCIETY AND ECONOMY 359,370-74 (Richard Rawlings ed., 1997) (expressing concern over the possibility
that, under the TRIPS Agreement, States may threaten international litigation as a means of securing
private rights for their citizens in other States). Professor Cornish expresses concern that this litigation will
take place wholly divorced from the political institutions of each State to the dispute, yet the outcome will
determine the essence of the laws on the subject in all States party to the Agreement. See id. at 374. He
advises that international obligations should become European Community law "only after the law-making
institutions of the Community itself have settled in detail how this should occur and, in particular, how far
implementation should devolve to national law-makers in the Member States." Id.
4. Sovereignty is admittedly a nebulous term denoting the exercise of power over things or people.
In an economic context, sovereignty is exercised through ownership. Ownership is, in turn, characterized
by the right to exclude others from use and to control the terms governing interaction with the thing owned,
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ownership of creative content and thus grants copyright owners authority to
regulate how and under what terms protected information is sold, bought,
used, and otherwise transmitted. Recent legislation in the United States has
heightened the scope of copyright protection,5 while proposed legislation
seeks to include, in the copyright corpus, informational content not
traditionally recognized as protectable under copyright law.6 These legislative
developments purport to be a necessary and effective response to the
dependence of the U.S. economy on the production of information goods, and
the potential destabilizing impact of heightened global competition on U.S.
economic hegemony.7 Particularly in recent years, the pervasive ideology of
liberalized or "free" trade cast intellectual property protection as a primary
factor in penetrating foreign markets and (re)establishing U.S. dominance in
the global economy. This ideology is consistent with the venerable hypothesis
that American comparative advantage lies in technology." Since intellectual
or over which sovereignty is exercised. See generally Morris Cohen, Sovereignty and Property, 13
CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927) (recognizing private property as a form of sovereignty); Aoki, supra note 3, at 443
("[T]here is no single monolithic concept of sovereignty ... as we already live in a world of multiple,
overlapping, contradictory, and often times intensely contested sovereignties.").
5. The 105th Congress extended the term of copyright protection from life of the author plus 50 years
to life plus 70 years. The new law came into effect on January 1, 1999. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (to be codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-
304) [hereinafter Copyright Term Extension Act].
6. See Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 2652, 105th Cong. (1997) [hereinafter
Proposed Database Bill] (providing protection for collections of information; another version of this bill
was reintroduced in the 106th Congress as H.R. 354); Proposed Article 2B (a proposed state law that would
amend Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)). Article 2B proposes contract law rules that
could expand protection of copyright beyond its current scope. Opposition to proposed Article 2B by the
American Law Institute (ALl), which must vote favorably for amendments to the UCC, led to an
abandonment of the plan to integrate 2B under the aegis of the UCC. Instead, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) has recently decided to propose the text as an
independent statute for state adoption. The NCCUSL governing body will vote on the Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act (UCITA) for adoption sometime in late July. See NCCUSL to Promulgate
Freestanding Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act: ALl and NCCUSL Announce that Legal
Rules for Computer Information Will Not Be Part of UCC (visited Oct. 10, 1999)
<http://www.2bguide.com/docs/040799pr.html>. The copyright implications remain unchanged. For a
critique of Article 2B, now UCITA, from a copyright perspective, see Jessica Litman, The Tale that Article
2B Tells, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 931, 931 (1998).
7. See Marshall A. Leafer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New
Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 273 (1991); Kenneth W. Dam, The Growing Importance of International
Protection of Intellectual Property, 21 INT'L LAW. 627 (1987); Ralph Oman, Foreword: Intellectual
Property-Our Once and Future Strength 27 GEO. WASH. J. OF INT.'L L. & ECON. 301 (1994).
8. The conviction that the United States enjoys a comparative advantage in technology has
antecedents in the Industrial Revolution, but was confirmed by the dominance of the manufacturing
industry in the post-World War II years. The deployment of defense related research for commercial
application and the emphasis, during the Cold War, on applied science transformed the reigning ideology
that called for a separation of government and scientific endeavor. Since World War It, the United States
1999]
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property law protects the fruits of innovative activity, which lead to
technology production, a powerful conceptual link was forged between the
protection of intellectual property and the pursuit of the free trade ideal. The
theory that spawned from this union held that the United States enjoys a
comparative advantage in technology, due primarily to a well-developed
system of intellectual property rights, which provides incentives to individuals
to invest in creative activity. The theory concludes that, when intellectual
property rights are violated by international trading partners, the flow of free
trade is distorted, resulting in a significant reduction of welfare benefits that
should inure to a country engaged in free trade.9 To remedy this loss and to
restore the integrity of comparative advantage as the basis of free trade,
developed countries, led by the United States, introduced the protection of
intellectual property as a trade matter during the Uruguay Round of
multilateral trade negotiations. The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
has witnessed a dramatic increase in government support of research, including institutional alliances
between the private and public sector. This alliance is a deliberative policy initiative, encouraged by
scholars and industry, as a necessary complement to other efforts to strengthen domestic innovation. See
Edward M. Graham, U.S. Technological Innovation and the Nation's Competitiveness in International
Trade in TECHNOLOGY, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 1,2-6 (Hugh H. Miller & Rolf
R. Piekarz eds., 1982) (discussing the product life cycle model as the "best explanation for post WWII U.S.
dominance in technology-intensive goods"); Robert C. Holland, The Committeefor Economic Development
Report on United States Technological, in TECHNOLOGY, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY
79, 92 (Hugh H. Miller & Rolf R. Piekarzeds eds., 1982) (recommending expanded government support
for basic research). The Committee for Economic Development (CED) concluded that new policies to
stimulate innovation should concentrate most on improving the balance between real rewards and risks
incurred. See id at 87; James P. Chandler, The Loss of New Technology to Foreign Competitors, 27 GEO.
WASH. J. INT.'L L. & ECON. 305, 319-20 (1994).
9. There is an abundance of literature from opponents and supporters of international intellectual
property rights, iterating this theory, or at least, assuming its validity. See, e.g., Joseph W. P. Wong,
Overview of TRIPs, Services and TRIMs in THE NEW WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: READINGS, OECD
DOCUMENTS 173 (1994) (noting that developed countries are "naturally" concerned that their comparative
advantage should not be eroded by the lack of, or inadequate, intellectual property protection); Alberto
Bercovitz, Copyright and Related Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE
TRIPS AGREEMENT 145, 147 (Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 1998) [hereinafter
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE] (asserting that violations of copyright by companies
in newly industrialized countries has a negative effect on the balances of payments of developed countries).
The author concludes "It]his negative effect in the trade balance of developed countries has led to the
consideration of the protection of intellectual property at the highest political levels." See id.; see also J.H.
Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards oflntellectual Property Protection Under the TRIPs Component
of the WTO Agreement, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 21,23 (Carlos M. Correa
& Abdulqawi A. Yusefeds., 1998) (observing that competition in the manufacture of traditional industrial
products "has forced the developed countries to rely more heavily on their comparative advantages in
production of intellectual goods"); Chandler, supra note 8, at 313-314; EDWARD S. YAMBRUSIC, TRADE
BASED APPROACHES TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION (1992).
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Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement or Agreement) 0 is the fruit of
this marriage of trade and intellectual property.
In this Article, I argue that the harmonized rules of intellectual property
are unlikely to produce net welfare gains either domestically for the United
States or globally. The protection of information under intellectual property
laws within the multilateral trade system is ostensibly premised on the classic
theory of free trade which significantly constrains government intervention in
the marketplace. However, as the process of globalization has created
powerful links between markets, peoples, and cultures, it has also engendered
problems the solutions to which are dependent on a multiplicity of factors that,
perversely, require more, not less, government intervention in the marketplace.
At the same time, the heightened rules of intellectual property protection
evidenced in the TRIPS Agreement minimize and implicitly delegitimize, the
role of governments in ensuring that domestic constituencies have access to
the most significant resource of this era, namely, information. Consequently,
this Article begins with an examination ofthe claim that securing international
protection of intellectual property rights is consistent with liberal free trade
ideals. I conclude that this claim lacks any cogent theoretical or empirical
basis. I argue that the claim has largely gone unchallenged because of a tacit,
but influential, assumption by scholars and policymakers that the integration
of intellectual property into the international trade regime is consistent with
the welfare goals of domestic intellectual property protection.
The argument by the United States that international violations of U.S.
intellectual property rights has a welfare-distorting effect should be
understood as a conflation of two distinct welfare concerns. First, and most
obvious, failure to recoup full value for intellectual property products because
of large scale piracy reduces the revenue earned by the United States from the
sale of its products in international trade and thus constitutes a direct welfare
loss. Second, if one accepts the established wisdom that intellectual property
rights provide incentives for individuals to create, then failure to protect such
rights (or the lack of enforcement for these rights) retards creative activity or
reduces the rate of such activity to sub-optimal levels. This would lead to a
less direct, but equally palpable, welfare loss in the form of low levels of
creativity and innovation. Lack of enforcement would also likely lead to
inefficient and costly strategies to protect whatever innovations might occur,
while eliminating the prospects of disseminating new information to the
10. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, supra note 2.
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public. As most students of intellectual property are aware, these
objectives-to stimulate innovation, encourage diffusion, and eliminate the
public goods problem inherent in intellectual property products-are at the core
of the economic justifications for the intellectual property system in the
United States. Although these objectives are explicitly directed to enhance
domestic welfare, they have been elevated to universal status by economists,
international institutions, and other scholars who project the model of
intellectual property dominant in industrialized countries as an "objective"
economic model that is easily, and just as effectively, transplantable to any
country. This has given legitimacy to another trenchant assumption, that if
intellectual property protection enhances social welfare in industrialized
countries, the same must be the case for developing countries; the logical
extension being that overall global welfare is enhanced under a regime of
harmonized rules for intellectual property protection.
In previous work, I havejoined other scholars to demonstrate and criticize
the political, cultural, legal, and economic fallacy that underlies this argument,
not to mention its ahistorical premise and neo-colonial roots." Even if the
protection of intellectual property in each individual country were to produce
welfare benefits within that country, the enhancement of global welfare would
require not only uniformity in the rules of protection, but also that each
country shares similarities in history, culture, political organization, and legal
institutions so that each could potentially benefit in comparable ways from an
integrated international system. 2
The international protection of intellectual property has never had, and
does not now have, as its primary justification the promotion of global
welfare, where global welfare is defined as a universal enterprise ignorant of
stakes held by individual countries in the international economy or divorced
from political boundaries of individual States. If there is one thing that
globalization does not yet stand for, it is an eradication of national identity,
particularly in the context of multilateral trade negotiations where national
self-interest clearly is the motivating force for the compromises that emerge.
Instead, global welfare, at least in the intellectual property qua international
trade context, is often assumed to be the natural outcome of protecting
1I. See Ruth L. Gana, Has Creativity Died in The Third World? Some Implications of the
Internationalization of Intellectual Property, 24 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 109 (No. 1, 1995).
12. While globalization may, ultimately, bring this about, we are still a long way away from a "one
world" phenomenon unless by globalization we refer primarily to the implications of having one
superpower. That discussion is beyond the scope of this Article.
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intellectual property rights at national levels. Global welfare is thus implicitly
defined in terms of States acting as rational agents in pursuit of national self-
interest in the global marketplace. In short, global welfare, like national
welfare, is assumed to be the product of market based efficiencies that
simultaneously promote and reflect the pursuit of self-interest. Despite this,
domestic economic policy in most industrialized countries recognizes and
seeks to promote and implement non-market driven welfare benefits. For
example, government policies in areas such as education or scientific research,
or tax-based support for infant industries, are standard examples of welfare
benefits that do not derive from the free market model. In the specific area of
intellectual property, the U.S. fair-use exception in copyright 3 and other
limitations on the exclusive rights given to rights holders, also reflect welfare
concerns that are not subject to the market-based modeling that informs much
of the discourse on the protection of intellectual property. These well known
deviations from the free market paradigm reflect domestic attempts to rectify
weaknesses in the classical free trade theory and in intellectual property
theory. My task in this Article is to examine how these domestic deviations
from the underlying theories interact with the TRIPS Agreement, and in turn,
whether the Agreement is consistent with welfare norms in international trade
theory.
Drawing from the disciplines of welfare economics and political economy,
I examine the welfare model that informs modern international economic
relations theory and contrast it with the ideal of public welfare in copyright
law as elucidated through statutes and case law. The analysis presented in
Part I identifies and addresses two related welfare issues. First, is the
heightened protection of copyright reconcilable with conceptions of welfare
in international trade? Second, does heightened international copyright
protection simultaneously promote domestic public welfare norms of
intellectual property policy and maximize national welfare gains from
international trade? Put differently, does the international protection of
intellectual property advance the domestic progress of science and the arts?
For only if it does can the heightened levels of protection under the TRIPS
Agreement and subsequent international treaties4 be rationalized as welfare
generating for the United States, much less other countries. This is
particularly the case where, as in the United States, the domestic
13. See 35 U.S.C. § 107, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
14. See WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/94 [hereinafter WIPO
Copyright Treaty].
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implementation of these treaties dramatically undermines non-economic
welfare objectives of intellectual property policy. 5
Part II discusses the asymmetries between the concept of welfare that
dominates international trade and the concept of public welfare in copyright
law. The analysis seeks to present a global perspective of welfare that more
accurately reflects the political economy of copyright and ultimately enriches
the discourse on strategies for regulating the information economy. In Part III,
I offer some thoughts on the implications of heightened copyright protection
for those who are at the margins of the globalization process and for whom the
construction of public welfare in an information economy holds daily
economic significance. What emerges is a recommendation that
marginalization should no longer be viewed in its traditional application as
exclusion from political power. Instead, marginalization in the information
age should be viewed as sub-optimal access to computers, information, and
information technology. Viewed this way, marginalization ceases to be a
geographical marker identifying poor, underdeveloped regions of the world.
This new view of marginalization cuts through geographical boundaries and
rends the veil of Statehood to impact individual (potential) users of
information wherever they are located, albeit affecting disproportionately
citizens of developing and least developing countries. For example, Thailand
has more cellular phones than Africa; South Asia, with twenty-three percent
of the world population has less than one percent of Internet users. Globally,
thirty percent of Internet users have at least one university degree. English is
the language of choice on eighty percent of all Websites even though only ten
percent of the world's population speak it. In developing countries, men and
younger citizens make up the majority of Internet users. 6 In all, twenty
percent of the population of the world's richest countries constitute 93.3
percent of the Internet users.' 7
A sub-theme developed throughout the Article is the relationship between
the political and socioeconomic transformation of eighteenth century England,
which embraced free trade, and the evolution of copyright law. This
relationship provides historical antecedents for demonstrating how policies
that shape the discourse on public welfare in turn affect or reflect the ruling
ideology which determines, ultimately, how resources are distributed in a
15. See discussion infra Part 11I.
16. See UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 1999, 6 (1999).
17. Id. at 2 graph.
COPYRIGHT AND PUBLIC WELFARE
society. I conclude that the determination of resource allocation, including
allocation of intellectual property rights, must first reflect and promote
domestic welfare, since globalization does not entail a complete loss of
sovereignty. At the international level, rules of intellectual property
protection should include an express social welfare axiom of a negotiated
balance between the interests of users and rights-holders. Unless this is done,
I argue that welfare concepts in trade theory and intellectual property theory
will negatively reinforce each other and produce negative global welfare
results. While there are possibilities that certain provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement already make room for such negotiated balance, 8 ambiguities in
the language of the TRIPS Agreement, uncertainty over how the provisions
may be interpreted, and the significantly enhanced cost of violating the
Agreement are unlikely to produce an optimal mix of material and nonmaterial
welfare benefits (even if the latter is quickly eroding) that have proven
successful in undergirding the public interest in the intellectual property
policy of developed countries.
I. THE THEORY OF WELFARE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
VERSUS PUBLIC WELFARE IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY:
CONFLICTING IDEALS OR COMPLEMENTARY ENDS?
A. Social Welfare and International Trade Theory
Economic theory in the field of international trade is largely concerned
with maximizing the economic well being of nations through trade.' 9 Since
Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, economists have generally agreed that
18. See e.g., Article 13 which permits member States to provide narrowly tailored limitations and
exceptions to the exclusive rights granted.
19. According to Smith's classic formulation of free trade:
fT]here should be no interruptions of any kind made to foreign trade, that if it were possible
to defray the expenses [sic] of government by any other method, all duties, customs, and
excise should be abolished, and that free commerce and liberty of exchange should be
allowed with all nations and for all things.
ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 497 n. 17 (Bk. IV, ch. 3) (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., 1981) (internal
citations omitted). See generally, Bk. IV, chs. 2 & 3. For a recent, erudite work on the history of the
intellectual underpinnings of the development of the theory of free trade, see DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, AGAINST
THE TIDE: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF FREE TRADE (1996), and economist Paul Samuelson's path
breaking work on the value of international trade, Paul A. Samuelson, The Gains From International Trade,
5 CANADIAN J. ECON. & POL. SCi. 195 (1939).
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nations should trade with one another for their enhanced mutual benefit.2" The
central tenet of classical economics, adhered to by neo-classical and liberal
economists, is that welfare gains are maximized through the unfettered flow
of goods across national boundaries.2' Simply put, trade without barriers or
"free trade" enhances national welfare by encouraging specialization.
Specialization is, in turn, facilitated by the division of labor leading to the
most productive use of factors of production to provide goods at marginal
cost.
The systematic critique of the mercantilist economy laid out in Wealth of
Nations was both a political and an economic project. Mercantilist theory
emphasized strong State intervention to protect the domestic market from
imports. Mercantile policies benefitted select industries but diminished the
welfare of the general society by raising costs of production. According to
Smith,
[t]hat this monopoly of the home market frequently gives
great encouragement to that particular species of industry
which enjoys it, and frequently turns towards that
employment a greater share of both the labour and stock of
society than would otherwise have gone to it cannot be
doubted. But whether it tends to increase the general
industry of the society, or to give it the most advantageous
direction, is not, perhaps, altogether evident. 2
Smith demonstrated that the gains of those who benefitted from
mercantile-derived monopolies were ultimately eroded by the overall cost to
the nation. He pointed out that despite the trade policy implemented by a
society, there can be no improvement in the number of industries beyond what
20. In Wealth ofNations, Adam Smith simultaneously attacked the mercantilist policies ofeighteenth-
century Britain while also establishing the conceptual framework for free trade. Indeed, Jacob Viner has
observed that the ideas discussed in Wealth of Nations were not novel in Smith's time. Rather, he suggests
that the significance of Wealth of Nations is that it brought these ideas together in a systematic, coherent
theoretical construct, thus giving shape to the idea of free trade. See Jacob Viner, Adam Smith and Laissez
Faire, 35 J. POL. ECON. 198 (1927); see also Arthur I. Bloomfield, Adam Smith and the Theory of
International Trade, in ESSAYS ON ADAM SMITH (Andrew S. Skinner & Thomas Wilson eds., 1975).
21. See Samuelson supra note 19; see also Paul A. Samuelson, The Gains From International Trade:
Once Again, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE, SELECTED READINGS 131 (Jagdish N. Bhagwati ed., 1981); Paul
A. Samuelson, Welfare Economics and International Trade, 28 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1938).
22. SMITH, supra note 19, at 453 (discussing the impact of restraints on imports of goods that could
be produced domestically).
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the capital generated in the economy can sustain.' There must always be a
balance in the relationship between capital generation and employment (or
labor): "[t]he general industry of the society never can exceed what the
capital of the society can employ . . . the number of those that can be
continually employed by all the members of a great society must bear a certain
proportion to the whole capital of that society and can never exceed that
proportion." '24 Trade barriers direct capital to industries or sectors in which
it might not otherwise be employed, and, argued Smith, "it is by no means
certain that this artificial direction is likely to be more advantageous to the
society than that into which it would have gone of its own accord."2
Instead, Smith advocated little or no State intervention in the marketplace.
He argued that in the absence of monopolies or other distortions caused by
State interference, a merchant would prefer to invest capital in the home
market.26 This investment was done because of gains that come from
familiarity with domestic laws and the knowledge of the local market and its
supporting institutions.27 These benefits create an incentive for the merchant
to employ her capital domestically rather than in a foreign country.2 .
However, Smith observed, since such investment will be done only for the
sake of profit, the employment of capital will go to the particular industry
where the greatest value can be obtained.29 Left alone to pursue their own
self-interests,3" Smith argued that these self-serving merchants would
unknowingly contribute to overall national social welfare. 31 A merchant who
makes a decision to invest capital domestically, in doing so out of her own
self-interest, does so also for the public interest. For, in maximizing her
wealth, the wealth of the nation is inexorably maximized.32 This increase in
23. See id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 454-56.
27. See id. at 454.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 455-56.
30. Smith's grundnorm in a sense was his idea that individuals are motivated primarily by self-
interest. As such they will make rational decisions which inure to the benefit of society as a whole. For
a discussion of the moral and philosophical basis for Wealth of Nations, see RICHARD F. TEICHGRAEBER
Ill, 'FREE TRADE' AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF ADAM SMITH'S WEALTH OF
NATIONS (1986).
31. SMITH, supra note 19, at 456.
32. See id. It is important to note that in his discussion about wealth and the advancement of public
welfare, Smith was not referring to money. Indeed, the concept of wealth as money was attacked
vehemently in Wealth of Nations. See, e.g., id. at 438-5 I. Instead, Smith saw wealth as the increase in the
quantity and diversity of goods produced for consumption. Cf. JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF
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welfare would result, said Smith, because the "invisible hand" of the market
causes a convergence of private and social interest by promising value to the
merchant and effecting the production of greater goods for society at lesser
cost.
33
The discourse of free trade in terms of market forces, and particularly the
insistence that the government must be isolated from the market in order to
free "natural" economic forces, obscured the powerful political structure
embedded in Wealth of Nations.34  To the extent that free trade, as Smith
conceptualized it, rested on the premise that the government ought to have
little or no role in directing market processes or influencing market outcomes,
free trade required a fundamental reordering of the relationship between the
State and its polity. In this sense, the thesis so powerfully enunciated in
Wealth of Nations was a call to the political transformation in the role of the
State.3
POLITICAL ECONOMY 579 (W. J. Ashley ed., 1909) [hereinafter MILL, PRINCIPLES] (noting that "the notion
that money alone is wealth has long been defunct, but it has left many of its progeny behind it; and even
its destroyer, Adam Smith, retained some opinions which it is impossible to trace to any other origin").
33. According to Smith,
[e]very individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most advantageous
employment for whatever capital he can command. It is his own advantage, indeed,
and not that of society, which he has in view. But the study of his own advantage,
naturally, or rather necessarily, leads him to prefer that every individual is
continually exerting himself to find employment which is most advantageous to the
society.
SMITH, supra note 19, at 454.
34. Some scholars have noted that laissez-faire economics was developed simultaneously with free
trade, an academic association that no doubt has its roots in the fact that both are attributed to Smith in
Wealth of Nations. See W. MAX CORDEN, TRADE POLICY AND ECONOMIC WELFARE 2 (2d ed. 1997). This
approach to the political structure of Wealth of Nations accepts as valid the dichotomous treatment of
economic policy and political process. The consideration of economic goals as distinct from other national
policies is largely responsible for the inconsistencies in strategies for pursuing public welfare. As some
scholars have aptly stated, "[tirade policy cannot be understood without explicit attention to the political
channels through which policies are adopted. Economic efficiency is not the only consideration influencing
this process." Dillon et al., Future Directions in the Political Economy of Trade Policies, in
INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICIES, GAINS FROM EXCHANGE BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
273,274 (Odell & Willett eds., 1990); cf. RAJANI KANNEPALLI KANTH, POLITICAL ECONOMY AND LAISSEZ
FAIRE (1986) (making explicit the extension of free trade theory to political organization).
35. For an elaboration of the political dimensions of the principles in Wealth of Nations, see KANTH,
supra note 34, at 2-3 (describing classical economics as an empirically specific political science of
transition); see also id. at 10-41 (discussing the relationship between the politics and economics of laissez-
faire). One trade scholar suggests that Smith was not a "full-fledged" adherent to the laissez-faire doctrine,
and defends this contention with examples of Smith's support for government provision of certain social
services. See IRWIN, supra note 19, at 78. While it is true that Smith recognized a role for government
policies in cases where the market was unlikely to produce desirable outputs, most scholars have regarded
these as exceptions to the free trade principle rather than a fundamental derogation from the case for the
superlative "invisible hand" of the market. Indeed, in view of the implications of Smith's case for free trade
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Principles of Political Economy and Taxation by David Ricardo36 and
Principles of Political Economy by John Stuart Mill" added significant
theoretical dimensions to the edifice laid down in Wealth of Nations.3" While
Smith demonstrated that foreign commerce would increase specialization,
decrease costs of production, and ultimately benefit a country, Ricardo
developed the theory of comparative advantage.39 The theory of comparative
advantage, also known as the theory of comparative cost, states that countries
trading together will both benefit if they specialize in producing the good that
they can produce at a relatively lesser cost. 4o The theory of comparative
advantage was a significant contribution to Smith's treatise. The theory
established that international specialization enhances productivity, increases
wages, and decreases the cost of outputs. As Mill expounded:
There is much misconception in the common notion of what
commerce does for a country. When commerce is spoken of
as a source of national wealth, the imagination fixes itself
upon the large fortunes acquired by merchants rather than the
on mercantilist policies which were so heavily dependent on state protection, there is a strong basis for the
thesis that free trade was as much a political as well as an economic project. In the United States, legal
realists more fully developed this theme in their critique of market institutions that derived from the
adoption of the laissez-faire doctrine in the legal system. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Coercion and
Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SC. Q. 470 (1923); Cohen supra note 4; see
generally MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, THE CRISES OF
LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992).
36. David Ricardo, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, in I THE WORKS AND
CORRESPONDENCE OF DAVID RICARDO (Piero Sraffa ed., 1951).
37. MILL, PRINCIPLES, supra note 32.
38. Economists have disagreed over the intellectual relationship between Smith's Wealth of Nations
and David Ricardo's Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. Some classical scholars regarded
Ricardo's work as a break away from, or a sharp contrast to, the scientific model established by Smith. For
scholarly attempts to rationalize Smith and Ricardo, see Samuel Hollander, The Historical Dimension of
the Wealth of Nations, in THE LITERATURE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, COLLECTED ESSAYS 11 87 (Samuel
Hollander ed., 1998).
39. In Principles of Political Economy, Mill credits another scholar as being the first to develop the
principle of comparative advantage, but acknowledges Ricardo as having perfected the principle. See MILL,
PRINCIPLES, supra note 32, at 576.
40. In Ricardo's simple but classic model, one assumes two countries A and B, and two goods-food
and clothing. Further assume that one unit of food takes one day's worth of labor to produce in country A,
but two day's worth of labor to produce in country B. One unit of clothing takes one day's worth of labor
to produce in country B, but two days worth of labor to produce in country A. It is obvious that trade in
these items between A and B will be mutually beneficial where A's labor has greater productivity in food
and B's labor has greater productivity in clothing. Ricardo's theory went a step further. Welfare is still
enhanced even where country A has more productive labor in both items if it allows country B to specialize
in the good in which B has the strongest productivity, and A and B trade for those goods produced based
on respective comparative advantage. See Ricardo, supra note 36, at 134-41.
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saving of price to consumers. But the gains of merchants,
when they enjoy no exclusive privilege are no greater than
the profits obtained by the employment of capital in the
country itself. . . . Commerce is virtually a mode of
cheapening production; and in all such cases the consumer is
the person ultimately benefitted ... .4
Put differently, Ricardo's principle of comparative advantage
demonstrated that specialization would lead to a situation where the price of
outputs is equal to marginal cost.4 ' Mill later described the principle of
comparative advantage as "a more efficient employment of the productive
forces of the world" '43 leading not only to direct economic results, but also
indirect intellectual and moral gains." The principles developed by Ricardo
and Mill, as well as other classical economists,4 significantly enriched the
theoretical pillars of Smith's laissez-faire economy. Despite numerous
variations and refinement, the basic model of free trade based on comparative
advantage continues to dominate contemporary economic literature46 and,
certainly in the United States, has pervaded policy debates about appropriate
policy choices in the area of international economic relations.
The specific conditions under which free trade will maximize benefits to
every country remains a contested subject of inquiry,47 as is the question of
41. MILL, PRINCIPLES, supra note 32, at 580.
42. See id.
43. Id. at 578.
44. Mill identified gains such as increased cultural interaction between nations leading to greater
knowledge of the races; greater contact which would minimize the incidence of war; and enhancement of
global welfare by enlarging the amount and variety of consumptive goods. His identification of these
benefits from international trade anticipated the justifications espoused after World War II for the
establishment of the multilateral trading system. See generally JAGDISH BHAGWATI, Is Free Trade Passi
After All? in POLITICAL ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (Douglas A. Irwin ed., 1991).
45. See, e.g., JEAN BAPTISTE SAY, I TREATISE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY OR THE PRODUCTION,
DISTRIBUTION AND CONSUMPTION OF WEALTH (1821). Say was a French classical economist who
interpreted Smith's Wealth of Nations for the French. In so doing, he developed some theories of his own.
The theory for which he is particularly known is the "Law of Markets," which posits that supply creates its
own demand.
46. Cf Paul R. Krugman, Is Free Trade Passi?, I J. ECON. PERSP. 131, 131-34 (No. 2, 1987)
(describing a counter-culture in international trade literature based on new models that deviate from the
traditional rationale of comparative advantage as the primary basis for trade).
47. Wealth of Nations is often misquoted for the proposition that free trade is always the best for a
country. Indeed, Smith himself recognized that the market would not provide certain necessary social
institutions such as national defense and, as such, some intervention by the State was necessary for the
public good. Mill, in a controversial paragraph in Principles of Political Economy, advocated protection
for infant industries as an exception to the free trade ideal. Even the most ardent free trade advocates
recognize the need for government intervention for the public good. The contest is over the methodology
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what policy choices are optimal in dealing with those industries (and
individuals) who do not benefit from free trade.48 Smith's conclusion that the
invisible hand of the market will always cause a convergence of social and
private interests-so that individuals, and therefore nations, are better off-is
one of the considerable weaknesses of the free trade paradigm. In fact, there
are repeated significant divergences between social and private costs and
benefits.49 What benefits a nation as a whole will not necessarily benefit all
or even most individuals within that nation,"° and certain otherwise efficient
transactions may yield externalities that decrease welfare. A classic example
is pollution from factories, or the significant risk involved with activities such
as working with explosives or poisons. Smith, as did other classical scholars,
recognized that in certain cases the market will not always deliver the best
outcome for a nation, a phenomenon best known as market failure. For Smith,
an exception to the free market model was national defense,5 and for Mill, it
was the protection of infant industries. 2 Most scholars today agree that there
exist several sectors that should receive government support or outright
exclusion from the free trade paradigm. These exceptions are not rooted
exclusively in problems of market failure, but on principles of political
ideology and national interest. One significant national interest concern, and
a key weakness of the free trade ideal, is the social costs associated with free
trade.
Free trade theory, as with much classical economic theory, fails to account
for or to address issues of income distribution or distributive justice. 3 The
of government intervention-how much is needed, when is it needed, and what form should the intervention
take-a tariff or a subsidy? Welfare economics is largely concerned with this question and the means to
ameliorate the divergence between social and private costs and benefits. For a classic text on welfare
economics, see A. C. PIGOu, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 4th ed. 1962) (1920).
48. See, e.g., Robert Z. Lawrence & Matthew J. Slaughter, International Trade andAmerican Wages
in the 1980's: Giant Sucking Sound or Small Hiccup? 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY:
MICROECON. 161 (1993); Paul T. Decker & Walter Corson, International Trade and Worker Displacement:
Evaluation of the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program, 48 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 758 (1995); see
generally GARY BURTLESS ET AL., GLOBAPHOBIA: CONFRONTING FEARS ABOUT OPEN TRADE (1998).
49. The leading work in this area is PIGOU, supra note 47, at 172-203.
50. Id.; see also, IRWIN, supra note 19, at 219 (noting that the most obvious qualification to the free
trade model is the weak analogy regarding individual and national benefits from trade).
51. SMITH, supra note 19, at 463-64. Smith recognized other exceptions such as education for the
poor; taxes on foreign goods where competing home products have been taxed. Id. at 465. Additionally,
Smith recognized that the policy of one country may prevent another from establishing the "best" policy
of free trade. Id. at 539.
52. See IRWIN, supra note 19, at 116 (reviewing the infant industry argument).
53. See id. at 219. However, one approach to the comparative advantage model of free trade has
included income distribution effects on factors of production. See the cumulative model established by
economists Heckscher, Ohlin, and Samuelson. Eli Heckscher, The Effect of Foreign Trade on the
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more obvious social costs of free trade include worker displacement, high
unemployment rates, and, with some countries, growing trade deficits.54 Such
economic ills generate political pressure to revive protectionist trade policies,
d la the mercantilist era, to protect domestic industries and, ultimately,
domestic economy." The United States experienced each of these social costs
from the 1980s through the negotiation of the Uruguay Round. Scholarship
on the Uruguay Round negotiations has demonstrated a significant link
between the economic downturn in the United States and the vigor with which
negotiations on intellectual property became a central part of the trade talks.56
In addition to introducing intellectual property within the context of the
Uruguay Round, the United States also embarked on a series of unilateral
strategies to pry open foreign markets and secure protection of intellectual
property rights in specific countries. These strategies ranged from negotiating
bilateral trade agreements, use of voluntary export restrictions, and, with
regard to intellectual property, use of the notorious Section 301 provision of
U.S. trade law." In part, the Uruguay Round negotiations served to broaden
the platform on which these strategies might operate, while simultaneously
legitimizing the results obtained through these largely coercive strategies.
Most significant, however, the Uruguay Round ostensibly gave global
imprimatur to the theory that the protection of intellectual property is about
preserving the free trade ideal. The copyright industry in the United States,
largely responsible for marketing this theory, repeatedly made claims of
enormous losses to the industry and, consequently, the nation, because of
Distribution ofIncome, in READINGS IN THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 497 (H.S. Ellis and L.A.
Metzler, eds., 1949); BERTIL OHLIN, INTERREGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1933); Paul A.
Samuelson, InternationalTrade and the Equalization of Factor Prices, 58 ECON. J. 163 (1948).
54. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, there was significant preoccupation with the significant
trade deficit with Japan. This prompted some "voluntary" interventionist strategies in the automobile
industry, for example. For a discussion of the welfare impacts of voluntary export restrictions (VERs) and
other forms of intervention in free trade, see R.A. Brecher, Voluntary Export Restrictions Versus Import
Restrictions: A Welfare Theoretic Comparison, in PROTECTIONISM COMPETITION IN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE, ESSAYS IN HONOR OF W.M. CORDEN (H. Kierzkowski ed., 1987); see generally Anne 0. Krueger,
The Political Economy of the Rent Seeking Society, 64 AM ECON. REV. 291 (1974).
55. It should be remembered that mercantilists were not against trade per se, but in favor of high
import tariffs and other policies to protect domestic industry. See IRWIN, supra note 19, at chs. 2, 3
(discussing mercantilist theory and the emergence of free trade as a countervailing theory).
56. See, e.g., Gerald J. Mossinghoff, The Importance of Intellectual Property Protection in
International Trade, 7 B.C. INT'L. & COMP. L. REV. 235 (1984); See supra note 7 and references cited.
57. See 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1994). See generally ANNE 0. KRUEGER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
TRADE PROTECTION (1996). It is not farfetched to state that the path for the TRIPS Agreement was paved
by the use of domestic trade law to enforce intellectual property rights abroad.
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infringement overseas. 8 In essence, the TRIPS Agreement reflected the
globalization of U.S. domestic policy in the area of intellectual property
protection. Just as Section 301 explicitly linked domestic trade law to
international intellectual property protection for the singular purpose of
protecting domestic industry, so the TRIPS Agreement reflects a convergence
of international trade policy with domestic intellectual property policy. As I
discuss later in the Article, domestic intellectual property policy was
shortchanged in this marriage.
At first blush, the integration of intellectual property and international
trade appears consistent with the free trade model. However, when examined
more critically, the theoretical links between intellectual property and
international trade are very weak. First, there is no ineluctable correlation
between goods that embody intellectual property rights that constitute the
traditional subjects of trade, and the intangible rights that are associated with
the product. The first sale doctrine in copyright law is a classic example. 9
According to this doctrine, a copyright owner cannot use the intangible rights
granted by copyright law to control what an individual does with the physical
object that is the fruit of the creative expression.6' This is not to say that the
definition of "goods" for the purposes of trade cannot be expanded to include
the rights associated with creative expression; after all, the rationale is that
absent enforcement of these rights, the "goods" will not generate value to the
author. My point is that promotion of the free trade ideal does not lead
inexorably, or even logically, to heightened, harmonized rules of protection
and enforcement of intellectual property rights.
Second, to the extent that the United States copyright industry, via the
government, based its justification of intellectual property qua free trade on
the economic losses sustained from inadequate protection abroad, it reflects
an unfortunate capture of the international process to achieve purely domestic
concerns. In other words, the international protection of intellectual property
did not have as much to do with protecting free trade, as with protecting the
domestic economy, and a specific sector at that.
Third, in protecting primarily material benefits to the domestic economy,
the marriage of international trade and domestic intellectual property skewed
potential welfare gains against users of intellectual property in developed and
58. See infra note 166.
59. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 108.
60 Id
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developing countries, and ignored the possibilities of securing non-economic
welfare gains.
Fourth, and most important, the very grant of intellectual property is a
form of protectionism and, as such, is inherently contradictory with the free-
trade ideal. The public goods problem makes such protectionism necessary
to facilitate a market for intellectual property goods. Sectors and industries
dependent on intellectual property protection are examples of areas where,
absent such intervention, there would be massive market failure. State
intervention to cure such failure cannot, however, be easily or comfortably
justified as a matter of international free trade (which frowns on State
intervention directed at protecting domestic industry).
One might argue that developed countries had little choice but to defend
their remaining advantages, with respect to high-tech goods, to counter the
social costs associated with the loss of jobs in the manufacturing sector,
because of competition from developing countries whose large populations
and low wages are attractive to manufacturing firms. For the United States in
particular, with information production as its primary economic resource, it
made sense to protect intellectual property in a forum most likely to lead to a
preservation of its economic strength.
This argument has both moral and economic logic with which I do not
disagree. My point, however, is that as a doctrinal matter the protection of
intellectual property is inconsistent with the free trade model, exhibits the
presence of rent-seeking behavior at a global level, and has worked to the
detriment of other domestic interests historically fostered by the intellectual
property system. Thus, the weaknesses of the free trade model are negatively
reinforced by weaknesses in the intellectual property model, with potentially
adverse consequences for consumers worldwide, but particularly in
developing countries. While classical trade theory does recognize areas where
government intervention is necessary, such intervention typically is a response
to an explicitly domestic concern and not an instrument to further the goals of
international free trade.
The dominant justifications for expansive intellectual property rights
reflect a confluence of protectionist tendencies in general, as well as a fervent
belief in the primacy of intellectual property in determining the size of the
U.S. gross domestic product as reinforced by the creed of comparative
advantage. Yet, at the same time that free trade rhetoric is employed tojustify
expansive intellectual property rights, economists have increasingly
questioned comparative advantage as the sole or primary basis of free trade
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and, further, free trade as a primary source of domestic economic growth.6 '
This has produced a veritable body of scholarship calling into question the
continued legitimacy of the free trade ideal. As one leading trade economist
put it:
[T]he case for free trade is currently more in doubt than at
any other time since the 1817 publication of Ricardo's
Principles of Political Economy. This is not because of
political pressures for protection which have triumphed in the
past without shaking the intellectual foundations of
comparative advantage theory .... [N]ew models call into
doubt the extent to which actual trade can be explained by
comparative advantage; they also open the possibility that
government intervention in trade via import restrictions,
export subsidies, and so on may under some circumstances be
in the national interest after all.... [F]ree trade is... an idea
that has irretrievably lost its innocence. Its status has shifted
from optimum to reasonable rule of thumb. There is still a
case for free trade as good policy, and as a useful target in the
practical world of politics, but it can never again be asserted
as the policy that economic theory tells us is always right.62
The fact is that, historically, most nations have actively intervened in
international trade.63 Over the last ten years, for example, the United States
has employed a variety of domestic policy measures to counteract the social
61. For example, modem theories of endogenous growth. See, e.g., NICHOLAS KALDOR, FURTHER
ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC THEORY (1978); MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS
(1990). See also economic scholarship positing refinements of the comparative advantage theory,
particularly scholarship within the Heckscher-Ohlin framework. A compilation of seminal works in this
regard may be found in INTERNATIONAL TRADE, SELECTED READINGS Part I and 2 (Jagdish Bhagwati ed.,
1969).
62. See Krugman, supra note 46, at 13 1-32. Krugman's assertion has been very controversial among
economists, and considered revisionist by some. However, his claim did help to refine explicitly the liberal
free trade model by generating scholarship which pointed to the recognized limitations of free trade theory.
See BHAGWATI, supra note 44, at 6-7 (responding to Krugman and observing that post-war economists did
recognize that some deviations from the free trade model were theoretically justifiable; the question is
whether a particular country's reality fits any of the theoretical cases). Free trade remains the most
influential doctrine of international economic relations. See generally IRWIN, supra note 19.
63. See generally HARRY SHUTTr, THE MYTH OF FREE TRADE: PATTERNS OF PROTECTIONISM SINCE
1945 (4th ed. 1985) (arguing that despite strong rhetoric by governments in the post WWII era, the basis
of economic organization in most Western countries has been managed or qualified free trade).
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and economic effects of free trade."4 In the mid-i 980s, a policy of "strategic"
or "managed" free trade emerged in response to the domestic malaise
occasioned by the social impact of free trade and the resulting political
pressure on the U.S. Congress. Strategic trade theory emphasized policy
options, usually through support of domestic industry, to tilt free trade
favorably towards the domestic economy.65 Although some of these policies
are legitimate practices under the multilateral trading regime,6 there are others
that are arguably less desirable than others in terms of their impact on overall
welfare.67 Indeed, economists have been quick to point out that questions of
what strategies to use, when to use them, and what industry to use them in
favor of, are questions that must be determined in specific country contexts.68
If free trade is the rule, and some individuals are certain to suffer adverse
impacts from its application, how is domestic welfare enhanced? Specifically,
how is a social maximum-i.e., maximum utility-achieved from diverse
individual interests? This is the question of social welfare.69Voting and the market, the two mechanisms by which social decisions are
made in a free market democracy, have been shown to disadvantage discrete
and vulnerable social groups. Indeed, there is significant legal scholarship
demonstrating the failures of these institutions.70 More important for
64. See id.; see also Louis S. Jacobson et al., Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers, 83 AM. ECON.
REV. 685 (1992).
65. See Krugman, supra note 46, at 134-37.
66. The WTO agreement continues a number ofexceptions to the free trade ideal also protected under
GATT (art. XX), including a modem articulation of Mill's infant industry argument, (art. XVIII); an
exception to protect balance of payment concerns (art.XII); an exception for national security (art. XXI).
See generally BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WTO:
FROM GATT TO THE WTO (1997).
67. For example, most economists agree that government intervention in form of subsidies is more
desirable than interventions through tariffs. See, e.g., BHAGWATI, supra note 44, at 1-12.
68. See id. at 5.
69. Kenneth J. Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, LVII J. POL. ECON. 328 (1950);
Amartya Sen, The Possibility of Social Choice, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 349 (1999).
70. See, e.g., U.S. v. Carolene Products Co.,.304 U.S. 144 (1938). In Carolene Products, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a federal statute that prohibited the shipment of filled milk
in interstate commerce. The Court reasoned that a statute that provided economic regulation need only be
justified by the rational basis test. Having concluded that this legislation, ostensibly justified by
government concerns for the "public interest," the Court in a famous footnote, entered a caveat:
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political
processes which can obviously be expected to bring about a repeal of undesirable
legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation
... [n]or need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of
statutes directed at particular religions .. .or national or racial minorities ...
whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
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achieving social welfare is that neither of these institutions can operate to
determine and reflect choices that are highest on the social preference
system.7 In his influential article in 1950, Kenneth Arrow demonstrated the
difficulty of aggregating individual preferences in a way that satisfactorily and
consistently maximizes social welfare, whether the mechanism used is voting
or the market.72 The problem, as Arrow presented it, is that there is a wide
range of social states for individuals. Even if each individual ranked these
"orderings" by preference, it would still be difficult to determine which
particular social state is the most desirable. For example, some citizens might
want more innovation, despite the cost, to improve their quality of life,73 while
others prefer less innovation at less cost; still others who prefer to live as close
to a "natural" state as possible, or who value environmental safety more than
conveniences made possible by technology, may choose a state of minimal
innovation.
The market mechanism fails to yield true measurements of social welfare
because it cannot account for values which shape an individual's desires, and
which must be accounted for in the calculation of the social optimum.74
Paradoxically, globalization has created cross currents between the traditional
subjects of trade negotiations (tariffs and quotas) and a host of intensely
contested social concerns such as environmental safety, child labor, health
issues, and human rights. These issues have increasingly become intertwined
with multilateral trade talks, and as such, have become a part of domestic
political agendas of specific countries, including the United States.7" These
developments suggest that the regulation of free trade under the classic liberal
model will be subject to greater pressure as globalization makes isolated
responses to specific concerns increasingly difficult; selecting one problem for
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily
to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly
more searching judicial inquiry.
Id. at 152 n.4. For discussions on the implications of this footnote for the democratic process, see J.M.
Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 275,283(1989); Bruce A. Ackerman, BeyondCarolene Products,
98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 714-15 (1985); Lea Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts and the Fate of the Insider-
Outsider, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1291 (1989).
7 1. If determinable, this choice would reflect social welfare. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Formal Theories
of Social Welfare, in COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROw: SOCIAL CHOICE AND JUSTICE 115, 116
(1983).
72. Id. at 129-31.
73. See, e.g., Richard Lloyd Parry, Meet Robokitty, INDEPENDENT, Nov. 5, 1999 (describing the
demand for the latest robot pets manufactured by Sony. Each pet costs about 2,400 euros). These pets were
available for purchase through Sony's website at <http://www.world.sony.com/aibo>.
74. See Arrow, supra note 69, at 331.
75. See The Politics of Trade, ECONOMIST, Oct. 23-29, 1999. at 27.
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government intervention will directly implicate others. The interconnectedness
of these issues is certain to generate conflict.
The voting mechanism fails because of Arrow's "voting paradox" and the
related "impossibility theorem." Briefly, Arrow demonstrated that it is
impossible under a free market democratic system, to establish a pattern of
social decisionmaking that maximizes social welfare even with a set of
established individual tastes.76 Similarly, in the context of international trade,
Professor Samuelson demonstrated that, while free trade makes individuals
better off than a situation where there was no trade, it does not necessarily
follow that the post-trade equilibrium is optimal."' Indeed, under highly
specialized conditions, both the market and voting mechanisms can fail,
though they rarely do. Under what conditions, then, are changes in allocation
of resources optimal? Or, put differently, how can we determine what policies
are best for the overall welfare of a country?
Paretian optimality, the leading, if impracticable, theoretical model of
social welfare, requires that an economy's resources and output be allocated
in such a way that no reallocation can make anyone better off without making
another person worse off. If a change in the economy makes one person better
off and none worse off, then social welfare may be said to be increased. The
Pareto optimum and improvement scheme, like other welfare indicators, rests
on valuejudgments about what state of economy is best for society as a whole.
It provides no system for attaining the optimal state or measuring the
improvement. Scholars, including Arrow and Samuelson, have criticized the
Paretian scheme" as confining and incapable of guiding social policy.
Specifically, Arrow noted that, in the absence of ethical justifications for the
status quo, there is no reason for insisting that a reallocation be harmless in
order to be welfare maximizing, particularly when the initial distribution is
already questionable.79 He sought a method of defining social welfare without
the method being plagued by the problems of interpersonal utility
76. See Arrow, supra note 69, at 127-3 1. This is illustrated by three individuals, 1, 2, and 3 and three
alternatives A, B, and C. Individual I ranks her preferences in order as A:B:C; individual 2 as B:C:A; and
individual 3 as C:A:B. Two individuals prefer A to B, and two individuals prefer B to C, but a majority
prefers C to A. However, if we assume that the community behaved rationally, our choice would be first
A, second B, and third C. This, in sum, is the paradox of voting. Arrow concludes that neither plurality
voting nor proportional representation will remove the paradox, and the market will not produce a rational
alternative. See id.
77. See Samuelson, supra note 19, at 265. Krugman repeats this point. See Krugman, supra note 46,
at 134.
78. Arrow, supra note 69, at 329.
79. See id.
COPYRIGHT AND PUBLIC WELFARE
comparisons."' Adopting Bergson's formulation ofa social welfare function,"'
Arrow proposed a set of conditions to circumscribe the range of permissible
options reflecting social welfare.82 Applying these conditions, Arrow
concluded that the only method of moving to a state of social welfare that
comprises an aggregate of individual preferences will require the imposition
of a dictatorship.83 Thus, in a free market democracy, social welfare must be
based on an ethical (or normative) rule that assigns value to certain social
outcomes. The ethical system is the rule, which selects a social state as the
optimal welfare choice from a given set of alternative distributions of goods.84
This ethical system may be "public policy," the theory of the market place, or
another normative system for evaluating and making social choices. Thus, the
determination of what constitutes social welfare is a political judgment,
rationalized through the democratic process or the market mechanism. 5
In a recent article on social choice theory, Nobel laureate Amartya Sen
noted that majority rule is inconsistent with social welfare, particularly where
distribution issues are the primary concern.86 He proposes an expansion of the
strict Arrovian framework to allow a greater informational base for
interpersonal comparisons. Rather than exact interpersonal comparisons of
utility, Sen suggests that "partial comparability" is capable of yielding a sound
basis for making welfare choices.87 Thus, rather than comparing mental
states-what people desire or want-Sen suggests that comparing interpersonal
utilities may be more malleable for making welfare choices that reflect
distributional concerns. This model avoids Bentham's utilitarian focus on the
sum total of utilities as a measure of welfare, yet does not ignore interpersonal
comparisons necessary to evaluate utility, in a way that is sensitive to
80. See id.
81. This is a means by which utility is assigned to a particular set of options reflecting social
preferences with the ultimate goal of identifying the highest social state given the relevant constraints. See
Abram Bergson, A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare Economics, LII Q. J. EcoN. 310 (1938).
82. See Arrow, supra note 69, at 334-39.
83. See id. at 342.
84. See id. at 345.
85. For example, the Senate recently voted against a bill that would have restricted steel imports.
Trent Lott, the Senate Majority leader, argued that such a bill "would adversely affect our businesses and
farmers who depend upon access to the international market. There's no question that this bill will undercut
the economic growth that we enjoy today." See David E. Sanger, Senate Kills Effort to Impose Tight Limits
on Steel Imports, N.Y. TIMEs, June 23, 1999, at Al.
86. See Amartya Sen, The Possibility of Social Choice, 89 AM. ECON. REv. 349,354 -55 (1999).
87. Id. at 355-57.
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inequalities in opportunities and individual well-being.8 As Sen poignantly
elucidates:
A hopeless destitute with much poverty, or a downtrodden
laborer living under exploitative economic arrangements, or
a subjugated housewife in a society with entrenched gender
inequality, or a tyrannized citizen under brutal
authoritarianism, may come to terms with her deprivation.
She may take whatever pleasure she can from small
achievements, and adjust her desires to take note of
feasibility (thereby helping the fulfilment of her adjusted
desires). But her success in such adjustment would not make
her deprivation go away. The metric of pleasure or desire
may sometimes be quite inadequate in reflecting the extent of
a person's substantive deprivation. 9
For my purposes, Sen's model offers new insights into what constitutes
public welfare while providing a means for calculating such welfare results in
a way that requires resource allocations to flow where it is needed, without
ignoring the preferences and tastes of others. Implicit in this model is the
principle that true welfare is a result of an overall improvement in standards
of living and quality of life for all, not simply those who command a majority
vote or, in regard to the global economy, those with access to information. 9
Sen's thesis is consistent with Smith's other important, if less celebrated work,
Theory of Moral Sentiment" which defines welfare as the quality of life
attainable. Although Wealth of Nations defined welfare in material terms (i.e.
level of real income) Smith's treatment of the role of the state reflects his own
concern with issues of allocation. For example, Smith argued that taxes
should not be levied on necessities.92 He viewed the task of government as the
"provision of plentiful revenue or subsistence for the people, or more properly
to enable them to provide such a revenue or subsistence for themselves."93
88. Id. at 358.
89. Id. (citation omitted).
90. Indeed, Sen notes that the model may account for different items, such as income and resources,
to evaluate a person's advantage as well as the mental state these resources produce. He also notes that
ownership of primary goods and resources, and the ability to convert them in ways that improve quality of
life would improve the model and provide a better basis for social judgement. Id. at 358-59.
91. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS
92. See generally SMITH, supra note 19 (Bk. V. ch.2).
93. Id. at 428.
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Predictably, mainstream liberal economic scholarship failed to temper laissez-
faire economic theory with the "philosophical" themes of Theory of Moral
Sentiment, most likely on the academic ground that, as some commented, the
works "relate to different areas of life." '94 This dichotomy between the
"economic" and the "philosophical," a pervasive feature of Anglo-American
legal culture,95 has served to perpetuate an impoverished ideal of welfare in
the modem State, and has played a significant role is the entrenchment of
laissez-faire as the indomitable characteristic of American capitalist
democracy.
Several principles have emerged from the discourse of social welfare and
free trade. First, modem free trade theory has traditionally viewed welfare as
a function of efficiency, that is, having more goods at lesser costs. However,
free trade only results in an efficient outcome if the price mechanism works
well; price must reflect true social costs.96 Who are the losers, and what will
it cost to compensate them (or not)? This question invokes the political
process. However, political outcomes do not always reflect social welfare,
particularly where distributional issues are at stake. To this end, external
trade opportunities should be evaluated independent of, even if correlated
with, one's domestic trade policy. In other words, in determining what policy
choices will promote social welfare, the focus should be on achieving
domestic priorities. There are strategic justifications for this. The success of
free trade depends on the existence of strong governments that can respond
effectively to public prejudices that would otherwise affect the general
equilibrium in society.97 Public prejudice in the United States towards Japan
in the late eighties, and the resulting venal politics that resulted in negotiated
trade restraints against Japanese products, is one example of how governments
are sometimes forced to respond to threats to domestic equilibrium that are
fostered by deep prejudice. Perceptions that free trade is not fair, and that the
government is more concerned with international affairs than domestic well-
being can lead to severe political penalties within the home country. 98
Consequently, domestic social welfare is a critical component of a viable free
94. Id. at 38.
95. See generally, HOROWITZ, supra note 35.
96. See BHAGWATI, supra note 44, at 7; see generally Arrow, supra note 69; Samuelson, supra
note 19.
97. See SMITH, supra note 19, at 471-77. See also BHAGWATI, supra note 44.
98. See generally, Robert E. Baldwin, The Changing Nature of U.S. Trade Policy Since World War
Ii, in THE STRUCTURE AND EVOLUTION OF RECENT U.S. TRADE POLICY 5 (R. Baldwin and A. Krueger
eds., 1984).
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trade regime. Free trade then, ironically, requires strong domestic political
institutions and effective government policies to calibrate the inherent tension
between domestic welfare and global free trade. 9 Additionally, if welfare
gains for free trade is the function of a nation's pursuit of self-interest, then
it follows that failure to pursue national self-interestfirst, will lead ultimately
to a loss in overall global welfare. In short, States do not exist for free trade,
free trade exists for the State. And to restate Samuelson's thesis, not only is
free trade not the scientifically superior state of equilibrium, it is but one
option, even if the most preferable, in a continuum of strategies available to
promote domestic social welfare.
Second, free trade maximizes returns through specialized production,
which can be used to facilitate the exchange of other goods, or through
manufacturing the goods oneself. Noted trade scholar Jagdish Bhagwati
observes that a mix of the two techniques may be used to produce returns at
the margins."° Thus, even if a nation does not have a comparative advantage
in the production of a product, other factors may require that the nation
should, in any event, produce that product. Third, comparative advantage is
only one basis for trade. The factors that stimulate economic growth and
prosperity go beyond the principle of comparative advantage to issues wholly
determined by domestic policies in areas such as science, education, research
and development funding, industrial policy, and regulatory regimes. °10 The
success of intellectual property policy is in part dependent on the success of
these macroeconomic building blocks, reinforcing again, the need for strong
99. See Samuelson, supra note 19, at 266. Professor Samuelson is quick to point out, however, that
this does not mean that he is against the orthodoxy of free trade, merely that the question of free or freer
trade is, to him, primarily a political one. Id. Before choosing this option as "the best" other factors must
be considered.
100. See BHAGWATI, supra note 44, at 7.
101. See, e.g., Juhana Vartiainen, Understanding State Led Industrialization, in GOVERNMENT AND
GROWTH 229-39 (Villy Bergstrom ed., 1997). The author examines the experiences of four countries that
underwent late industrialization, namely Taiwan, Korea, Finland, and Austria. In each country, the State
was heavily interventionist and worked in concert with labor and business to determine and implement
strategic industrial and economic decisions. The author stops short of recommending State intervention
as a principle worth replicating by all countries. However, the author does note that too much attention has
been paid by developed countries to the creation of free exchange as a requisite for growth and
development. The author concludes that under certain conditions well organized State interventionism can
produce good economic results. See generally, COMPETITION POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE BASED ECONOMY (Robert D. Anderson & Nancy T. Gallini eds., 1998) (a
series of articles that examine the interface between competition policy and intellectual property policy in
Canada); Donald G. McFetridge, Intellectual Property, Technology Diffusion and Growth in the Canadian
Economy, in COMPETITION POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE BASED
ECONOMY 65, 65-75 (Robert D. Anderson & Nancy T. Gallini eds., 1998). See generally, infra Part Ill.
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government and some intervention in the market at the very least to provide
a framework in which the gains of free trade can more fully materialize.
What is clear about the theory of international free trade is that the
pendulum is fixed not on an unequivocal and absolute support for "free" trade,
but on an emergent consensus that the principle of free trade must be tempered
with some government intervention." 2 The consensus, however, is more aptly
characterized as political, rather than economic.0 3 Whether free trade is
always in the best interest of a nation, is a question of politics, policy, and
economics, and more often than not, a precarious balance of all three.'" While
the rhetoric of free trade remains strong, and free trade remains the dominant
theory of international economic relations, government manipulation of
market forces is an explicit exercise of political choice at the national and
international level. Domestic manipulation of the free trade principle is
manifested through the powerful role of actors, governmental and non-
governmental, in shaping national (trade) policymaking.0 5 This was precisely
the case during the TRIPS negotiations, and almost the case during the
negotiations for the two recent international treaties on protecting intellectual
property in the digital age."°6 At the international level, political manipulation
102. Even the WTO recognizes the need for government intervention in certain prescribed cases, and
has made a provision for derogation in those cases. See HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 66 (citing
exceptions from the WTO disciplines). Bhagwati suggests, however, that exceptions in a free trade regime,
should be treated differently, in theory, from exceptions to the free trade principle. See BHAGWATI, supra
note 44, at 13.
103. See Henry R. Nau, Domestic Trade Politics and the Uruguay Round: An Overview, in DOMESTIC
TRADE POLICY AND THE URUGUAY ROUND 1,3 (Henry R. Nau ed., 1989) [hereinafter DOMESTIC TRADE]
(noting the importance of interest group politics and institutional forces that shape trade policy and
describing them as the "proximate" factors affecting national trade policy making); ROBERT E. BALDWIN,
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF U.S. IMPORT POLICY 41 (1985) (showing that votes on trade by Congress
generally reflect the particular industries in the Congress person's respective constituency). But see the
work of some economists who, in defense of free trade, have developed a theoretical model that seeks to
address the distortions that lead to government intervention in free trade. See generally CORDEN, supra
note 34.
104. See F.W. TAUSSIG, I PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS, chs. 36, 37 (4th ed. 1939) (arguing that a case
for free trade or protectionism cannot be made on perceived benefits to social soundness or welfare).
105. See I.M. Destler, United States Trade Policymaking in the Uruguay Round, in DOMESTIC TRADE,
supra note 103, at 191 (discussing interest groups politics and trade policy in the United States); see also
Isaiah Frank, Toward Freer Trade Among Nations: A U.S. Perspective, in TOWARDS FREER TRADE
BETWEEN NATIONS 44, 55 (John Nieuwenhuysen ed., 1989):
It would be a mistake, however, to ascribe protectionist acts of govemment mainly
to a failure to appreciate the intellectual case for free trade. By and large they are a
reaction to pressures from special domestic groups acting rationally in their own
interests... And traditionally, Congress has responded to the concentrated and well-
organized pressures of special groups whose jobs and incomes are threatened by
imports, despite the more diffused interest of the nation as a whole in open markets.
106. See Pamela Samuelson, The US. DigitalAgenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 369 (1997).
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is often couched in terms of unfair trade, which, to quote Bhagwati,
has become "the handmaiden of protectionism."'0 7 Nevertheless, he
acknowledges that "pluralist politics will generally rule out accommodation
to free trade unless trade is also seen to be fair."'0 8 The international
expressions of national political choice should at least represent more than the
rent-seeking activities of special interest groups. Otherwise, the distortions
inherent in market intervention are further exacerbated by capture of the
political process.
B. Copyright and Discourses of the Public Good
In the United States, the various categories of intellectual property serve
distinct ends with a unifying purpose-the promotion of public welfare. °9
These ends were so important that protection of the two principal categories
of intellectual property was mandated by the U.S. Constitution." 0  Patents
were conceived primarily as a necessary means to stimulate inventive activity
for industrialization to the greater benefit of the young nation."' Copyright
protection evolved to encourage creativity in the arts."' This deceptively
simple legal architecture has produced a complex labyrinth of judicial
107. JAGDISH BHAGWATI,THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AT RISK 15 (1991).
108. Id. at 14.
109. According to James Madison, the utility of the constitutional grant was evidenced by the fact that
intellectual property rights affords a rare instance of the public good coinciding fully with claims of
individuals. See The Federalist No.43 (James Madison) (1941). In the frequently cited landmark case of
Mazer v. Stein, the Supreme Court stated in dicta that "copyright law like patent statutes, makes reward to
the owner a secondary consideration .... The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress
to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that ... it is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of authors and inventors." Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,471 (1954) (emphasis added);
see also PAUL GOLDSTEIN, I COPYRIGHT 6 (2d ed. 1996) (arguing that this quote is frequently
misunderstood as subordinating author's rights to public interest). Goldstein argues that the point of the
dicta is that a proper balance between the two is necessary to satisfy the goals of copyright. See id.
110. U.S. CONST. art. i, § 8, cl. 8 (vesting Congress with power "to promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries"). The Patent and Copyright Acts are derived from this Constitutional
authority.
Il 1. The first Patent Act was passed in 1790, obviously a priority for the first Congress. See Patent
Act of April 10, 1790, I Stat. 109 (1790) (repealed 1836). There are many important accounts of the
historic value of the patent system to the rapid growth and development of the United States. See, e.g.,
THOMAS P. HUGHES, AMERICAN GENESIS: A CENTURY OFINVENTION AND TECHNOLOGICAL ENTHUSIASM.
1870-1970 (1989); see also Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote The Progress of Useful Arts: American
Patent Lav and Administration, 1787-1836 (Part 2), 80 J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF. SOC'Y 1I, 25-26
(1998).
112. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); GOLDSTEIN supra note
109, §1.1 (1989); Walterscheid, supra note I ll, at 33.
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decisions and a proliferation of legislative initiatives proposing, and
sometimes granting, greater protection to owners of intellectual property." 3
But knowing the objective of the scheme does not naturally lead to a precise
methodology for its fulfillment nor to a measure of how to determine its
success or failure. Indeed, several courts have viewed the maximalist
enforcement of intellectual property rights as necessary to ensure fulfillment
of the Constitutional goals." 4
The dominant conception of the public welfare vision explicit in the
Constitutional authority has come primarily from law and economics
scholarship, which has offered economic analysis of intellectual property
rules, particularly patent law." 5 Generally, this scholarship has emphasized
the importance of intellectual property rules first, in ensuring that private
producers have the necessary incentive to create and second, to preserve the
ability to appropriate value from the utility users derive from the created
work." 6 The standard thesis is that absent intellectual property rules, this
appropriation may not take place'17 or may take place at a sub-optimal rate,
thus discouraging rather than encouraging creative activity. "8 Legal scholars
and economists have equally accepted this analysis. Implicit in the thesis is
I 13. See, e.g., Copyright Term Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (extending
copyright protection to life plus 70 years); Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112
Stat. 2860 (1997) [hereinafter Digital Copyright Act] (amending Title 17 and modifying United States law
to meet obligations imposed by WIPO Copyright Treaty and WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty);
Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 2652, 105th Cong. (1997) [hereinafter Proposed Database
Bill] (providing protection for collections of information) (A version of this bill was reintroduced in the
106th Congress as H.R. 354); Proposed Article 2B (a proposed state law that would amend Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code). Article 2B proposes contract law rules that could expand protection of
copyright beyond its current scope. For extensive analysis of the impact of proposed Article 2B on the
public welfare goal of copyright, see Litman, supra note 6, at 931 (criticizing proposed Article 2B as
contemplating an "assertion of rights beyond those provided by any branch of intellectual property law").
114. See, e.g., Basic Books Inc. v. Kinkos Graphics, 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
115. See Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resourcesfor Invention, in THE
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS (1962). For economic
analysis of copyright see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989); Arnold Plant, The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books,
I ECONOMICA 167 (1934); Ian E. Novos & Michael Waldman, The Effects of Increased Copyright
Protection: An Analytical Approach, 92 J. POL. ECON. 236 (1984); Robert M. Hurt & Robert M.
Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copyright, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 421 (1966); Robert W. Frase, The
Economic Rationale of Copyright, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 435 (1966) (commenting on Hurt and Schuchman,
supra); Carlos Alberto Primo Braga, The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights and the GA 77': A View
From the South, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 243 (1989).
116. See Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of
Intellectual Property, 5 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 3, 5 (1991).
117. See id; see also Arrow, supra note 69.
118. See generally Besen & Raskind, supra note 116, at 3.
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the idea that the production of such work is the sine qua non of public welfare,
at least public welfare relating to intellectual property. As a result, law and
economics scholarship has focused disproportionately on the levels of
protection necessary to sustain creative activity and tilting, typically, in favor
of stronger protection for intellectual property owners.
In addition to economic analyses, there is a strong body of scholarship
offering another perspective on the public interest in copyrighted works." 9
Scholarship in this vein has been vigilant in asserting the primacy of public
welfare in relation to the pecuniary gains of rights of owners. The emphasis
of this scholarship has been the balance between rights of owners and users
of copyrighted works.. This balance, the argument states, is pivotal to the
public welfare goals integral to the Constitutional framework for the
protection of copyright. While both sides tend to agree on the role of an
incentive structure in ensuring a steady production of works, these public
interest advocates insist that the utilitarian theory undergirding copyright
demands that the protection of such works be balanced by limits on the rights
of owners. The balance between the public interest in access to creative
works and the author's interest in remuneration for her efforts is maintained
through doctrines in copyright law such as fair use,'20 first sale,'2' and, more
limitedly, through express statutory provisions.' 2
119. See, e.g., Litman, supra note 6: Jessica Litman. The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990).
120. The fair-use doctrine is fundamental to the public policy behind copyright laws. Originally a
judicial doctrine, fair use was codified in the 1976 Copyright Act. See 35 U.S.C. § 107, 33 I.L.M. 81
(1994). The fair use doctrine legitimizes certain limited uses of copyrighted works without liability for
infringement. Examples of such uses include news reporting, teaching, criticism, comment, scholarship
or research. The statute lists factors to be considered in evaluating whether a particular use is fair use. See
id.; see also Harper & Row, Publishers.. Inc. v. Nation Ent., 471 U.S. 539 (1985)(applying the factors to
unauthorized quotations of Gerald Ford's unpublished manuscript). The Court found that this use was not
protected by the fair-use doctrine. Id. at 556. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984) (finding manufacturers ofVCRs and VTRs not liable forcontributory infringement for time-shifting
videotaping of television broadcasts). According to the Court, "[tlo the extent time-shifting expands public
access to freely broadcast television programs, it yields societal benefits .... [This interest] supports an
interpretation of the concept of'fair use' that requires the copyright holder to demonstrate some likelihood
of harm before he may condemn a private act of time-shifting as a violation of federal law." Id. at 454.
See also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994) (finding parody can be fair use).
121. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 109(a) (West 1998). The first sale doctrine provides that a copyright holder
cannot dictate what a buyer does with the physical copy of the copyrighted work. See id For the most
recent Supreme Court pronouncement on the limitation of rights by the first sale doctrine, see Quality King
Distribs. Inc. v. L'Anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998) (holding that copyright rights cannot
operate to bar what a purchaser does with the goods, even where the goods are imported to the United States
in violation of contractual arrangements).
122. See, e.g.. 35 U.S.C.A. §108 (reproductions by libraries and archives) (this section has been
amended by the Digital Copyright Act, § 404), § 110 (exemption of certain performances and displays),
§ II I (secondary transmissions); § 112 (ephemeral recordings).
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The dividing line between those who oppose expansionist tendencies in
copyright and those who embrace such tendencies is analogous to the free
trade versus strategic trade divide in international trade theory. There is
agreement on the basic principle; in the case of free trade, that free trade is in
the best interest of a nation (or that trade is better than no trade) and, in the
case of intellectual property, that the protection of creative works is in the
public interest. In both fields, the opposing sides also agree that some
government intervention is necessary. However, the normative question of
just how much protection is best for social welfare constitutes a point of
divergence. The divisions are not merely academic, but rooted very much in
particular convictions of the role of the State and the place of the market in a
capitalist economy. To demonstrate the parallels between conceptions of
welfare in international trade and international intellectual property protection,
and the pivotal role of political and economic ideology in constructing models
of public welfare, it is useful to examine, briefly, the division between
developed and developing countries in the international protection of
intellectual property. In so doing, it is also interesting to note the parallels
between the arguments made by developing countries against the extension of
intellectual property systems to their domestic economies, and scholars who
have contributed to attempts to stall the tide of maximalist copyright laws in
the United States.
1. An Often Told Tale: Developing Countries and Intellectual
Property
European expansionism-politically through colonialism and economically
through trade-ensured the spread of cultural concepts such as intellectual
property. The divergent philosophies of Europe and the United States in the
protection of intellectual property" 3 did not weaken initial attempts to extend
the system beyond their national boundaries. Instead, these philosophies
123. The protection of intellectual property is also a prominent feature of European legal systems.
Indeed, the inception of intellectual property protection is inextricably associated with historic European
cultural milieus. In Europe, generally, intellectual property philosophy emphasizes the importance of the
author/creator and the "natural" right of ownership to the product of intellectual labor. This approach
protects all the dividends that are the results of her efforts. Thus, for example, continental European
copyright protects the moral rights of the author. These rights include the right of integrity (to protect the
work from mutilation or distortion) and the right of attribution (to have one's name associated with the
work). These rights were recently granted limited recognition under American copyright law.
See The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 601-610, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990)
(reflected in §106A of the Copyright Act).
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successfully legitimized the argument that the international protection of
intellectual property is an indispensable requirement of international, and
ultimately national, economic well-being. In the post-colonial era,'24
developing countries were "encouraged" through a variety of means to adopt
intellectual property laws and, subsequently, to accede to international treaties
for intellectual property protection.'25 To this end, the utilitarian justification
of intellectual property had its earliest triumph over competing philosophical
perspectives. International institutions, influenced by success stories of
technological innovation in England and the United States, adopted the
philosophy that national protection of intellectual property was key to every
country's industrialization, growth, and development.'26
Intellectual property laws, it was argued, would stimulate creativity by
providing incentives to authors and inventors. In addition, intellectual
property laws were necessary to attract much-needed foreign capital to
developing markets'27 and to facilitate technology transfers from developed
countries to developing countries. At the same time, intellectual property was
also recognized as a"human right" under the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 2 ' creating moral pressure on developing countries to recognize this
"natural" law, and legitimizing the international political pressure to enact
national intellectual property laws.'29 The promulgation of such laws was
enabled by the work of international institutions, such as the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which drafted "model" laws for
124. This epoch coincided largely with the establishment of the Bretton Woods system which
established the GATT system.
125. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 828
U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention]; Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,
Mar. 20, 1883,21 U.S.T. 1583,828 U.N.T.S. 305 (as revised July 14, 1972) [hereinafter Paris Convention].
126. See WI PO, BACKGROUND READING MATERIAL ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 43 (1998) ("Without
a national industrial property system and, particularly, a patent system, it will be difficult for a country to
stimulate and protect the results of indigenous innovation.").
127. See, e.g., Milan Bulajic, International Protection of Intellectual Property and Foreign
Investment, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE PRESENT AND A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 51
(Detlev Chr. Dicke ed., 1987) (quoting the United States Registrar of Copyrights as saying "protection
of foreign intellectual property ... will enhance the attractiveness of a country to foreign direct
investment").
128. See G.A. Res. 217. U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Doc. A/810, at 71, 74 (1947).
129. See Ruth L. Gana, The Myth of Development, The Progress of Rights: Human Rights to
Intellectual Property and Development, 18 LAW & POL'Y 315, 315 (1996) (criticizing the recognition
of intellectual property as a human right under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights); see Rosemary
J. Coombe, Intellectual Property, Human Rights & Sovereignty: New Dilemmas in International Law
Posed by the Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge and the Conversation of Biodiversity, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 59,59 (1998) (evaluating the implications of human rights for the recognition of indigenous
knowledge and as a means to implement provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity).
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developing countries to emulate, and other United Nations specialized
agencies responsible for marketing the system worldwide. 3
Notwithstanding intellectual property laws, developing countries remained
marginalized in the global economy. Innovative technology was not then, and
is not now, a "natural" byproduct of incentives to create through a patent or
copyright system.' 3' However, the arts that had flourished in many
marginalized societies before copyright laws, continued to flourish unaffected
by the existence of copyright incentives.'32 Overall, the experiment with
intellectual property laws in developing countries was broadly regarded as a
failure in terms of accomplishing economic development goals. The persistent
economic malaise in many developing countries, despite elaborate technology
transfer regimes, gradually diminished the legitimacy of national intellectual
130. See Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 1967, 21
U.S.T. 1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter WIPO Convention] ("Desiring to modernize and render more
efficient the administration of the Unions established in the fields of the protection of industrial property
and the protection of literary and artistic works, while fully respecting the independence of each of the
Unions... " Id. at 1771 .); see also Roberto Castelo, Opening Address at the World Intellectual Property
Organization Roundtable on Intellectual Property and Indigenous Peoples (July 23-24, 1998)
WIPO/INDIP/RT/98/4C (describing WIPO as a "custodian" of the international intellectual property
system).
131. See J.H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in International Trade: Opportunities and Risks of
a GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 747 (1989) (showing differences between views of
developing and developed countries with regard to GATT); id. at 26-56 (outlining elements of a
procompetitive strategy for developing countries that would serve their interests in acquiring technological
products); see also J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection
Under the TRIPs Component of the WTO Agreement, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE: THE TRIPs AGREEMENT 21 (Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqwai A. Yusefeds., 1998) (noting that one
advantage of TRIPS is the elimination of free riders and that compliance with TRIPS has the potential to
expand the capacity of developing countries to acquire skills necessary to compete in the technology
market); cf Ruth L. Gana, Problems and Prospects for International Copyright at the Close ofthe Twentieth
Century: Lessons for the United States (March, 1996) (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, Harvard University)
(on file with the Harvard University Library):
There is no question that technology transforms any society. Indeed, there is also no
question that technology is a critical resource for growth and development. What
has not been sufficiently addressed by developing country governments,
international institutions or scholars, however, is how different societies/countries
are able to develop technology that is suited to their peculiar environment. A central
issue is how the means of transfer determines the efficacy of the technology in the
importing country because control over when and how the technology is used
remains with the exporting country and the holder of the intellectual property right.
Further, the very decision to "transfer" technology affects values in the importing
country. Technology transforms the way people live; it creates possibilities that may
nevertheless not be realized because a broader framework to ensure sustained growth
does not exist.
Id.
132. See Gana, supra notes 129 & 131 (suggesting reasons why Western-style intellectual property did
not have similar effects in developing countries).
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property laws and, ultimately, of the international system.'33 Dominant issues
of concern included the prohibitive costs of licenses for copyrighted works,
the strict terms of use imposed by licensing agreements over patented
products, and the disparate levels of bargaining power between users of
protected goods and intellectual property owners. Countries at the margins
experienced the social and economic costs associated with intellectual
property rights, but none of the perceived systemic benefits-in particular, the
stimulation of local inventiveness.'34 The international system did not model
the public welfare provisions that were an integral part of the utilitarian platter
on which intellectual property protection was served to developing
countries.'35 Ultimately, it became clear that national economic prosperity
could not be predicated solely or even largely on the acquisition of technology
through the promise of intellectual property rights. Consequently, developing
country adherence to international treaties and enforcement of intellectual
property rights was less than enthusiastic.
In the early 1990s, the pervasive ideology of intellectual property
protection was reincarnated under the auspices of the international trade
system established by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) "'36
as a matter of "fair trade."'37 The liberal economic orthodoxy was centered
on the assumptions that the free movement of goods and services produced
efficiency in: (i) allocation of resources, (ii) production of goods, and (iii)
distribution. It was invariable that the market orthodoxy would continue to
triumph in international trade negotiations that extended to intellectual
property protection. For the United States in particular, the national interest
133. See A. Samuel Oddi, The International Patent System and Third World Development: Reality
or Myth?, 1987 DUKE L.J. 831 (1987) (describing the adverse consequences of the international patent
system for developing countries).
134. This is, arguably, attributable to many factors, not the least of which is the absence of supporting
legal institutions, general political instability, and economic malaise. However, the socioeconomic
conditions that characterize some developing countries does not fully explain why intellectual property
protection in these countries did not yield results comparable to developed countries. See Gana, supra note
131.
135. This may be explained in part by the fact that developed countries, due to their different
underlying philosophies of intellectual property, had different approaches to the protection of public
welfare. In some countries such as the United States, the doctrine of fair use played a significant role in
preserving welfare interests. England also has a fair use doctrine, but the British approach is decidedly
more restrictive than its U.S. counterpart. Other countries did not have explicit fair use provisions but,
instead, recognized limited exceptions to an authors exclusivity on a case-by-case basis.
136. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,61 Stat. A-I I, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S.
194 [hereinafter GATT].
137. Ironically, TRIPS is a highly protectionist treaty, and not at all representative of the free trade
features in GATT. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
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arguably at stake in the international protection of intellectual property
justified its aggressive stance at the trade negotiations.'3 After all, the
protection of national interests against encroachment by other nations is a
legitimate welfare goal in international fora, and consistent with some aspects
of social welfare theory in international trade.'39 The resulting TRIPS
Agreement 140 formally established an inextricable relationship between trade
and intellectual property rights. The Agreement replaced the decaying
international system; the treaty expanded the scope of protection for
intellectual property rights, provided the necessary legal and institutional
structure for a global information industry, and laid the foundation for global
control of access to information and associated technology. With its century-
old antecedents, the globalization of information through the TRIPS
Agreement, reinforced by subsequent international agreements, posed an even
greater threat to developing countries, and to the welfare interests of users in
the United States.
2. Private Welfare
The question of whether copyright is about (international) trade, and thus
a proper subject of that field, requires an inquiry beyond the fact that
copyright law, by enabling the commodification of information, ensures that
international trade flows will facilitate market transactions in the copyrighted
product. Indeed, the genesis of modern copyright law was trade-a commercial
battle between booksellers in eighteenth-century England over proprietary
rights in manuscripts.' 4 ' The system of Royal Charters and privileges
obscured the need for property rights in creative work since the Crown granted
these privileges in the form of monopolies. 42 With the promulgation of the
world's first copyright statute, the Statute of Anne of 1710, the privilege was
138. See generally Symposium, Trade Related Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (pts. I & 2),
22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 223, 689 (1989).
139. See, supra pp. 125-128.
140. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in
Counterfeit Goods, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
141. There is an impressive amount of literature which discusses the evolution of modem copyright.
For leading historical works, see LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1 968);
BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT (1967).
142. For an overview of the social and economic conditions that bedeviled authors, as well as the
economic structure of the relationship between authors and publishers, see I VICTOR BONHAM CARTER,
AUTHORS BY PROFESSION (The Society of Authors eds., 1978).
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codified and given to authors, instead of publishers.'43 The transfer of
ownership to authors, a disaggregated group, rather than the guilds that
characterized the mercantilist economy, led gradually to a "market" for the
exchange of copyright privileges in return for remuneration to the author. The
economically strategic importance of this move by British Parliament was
deliberate. The preamble to the Statute of Anne made clear that part of the
overarching policy was to secure the private welfare of authors and their
families'" and, by so doing, promote the general public welfare by rewarding
authors and thus encouraging the production of literary works. Copyright in
this sense was "trade," a means of livelihood for authors and booksellers.'45
The enhancement of private welfare through gain from copyrighted works
would seem, at least perfunctorily, to reflect the work of the invisible hand of
the market causing public and private interests to converge. Yet, an assiduous
study of the history of copyright in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
England reflects the divergence of social and private interests. For example,
universities and public bodies were granted eleven copies of published works
under the amendments to the Statute of Anne. This policy was vigorously
opposed by some who argued that it was unfair to reduce the economic worth
of the copyright by dispensing a public grant.'46 Yet, development of the
conception of "author" as a phenomena unaffected by or unrelated to society,
is, to borrow from scholars such as Jamie Boyle, merely a romantic view of
authorship. 7 This view of authorship, as some scholars have suggested, may
143. See Statute of Anne 1710, 54 Geo.llI, ch. 156, § 14 (Eng.).
144. The preamble stated:
Whereas Printers, Booksellers and other Persons have of late frequently taken the
Liberty of printing reprinting and publishing or causing to be printed, reprinted and
published Books and other Writings without the Consent of the Authors or
Proprietors of such Books and Writings, to their very great Detriment and too often
to the Ruin of themselves and their families ... [to prevent] such Practices ... and
for the Encouragement of learned Men to compose and write useful Books ....
Id. Proposed bills leading up to the final statute reflected similar concerns. See also ROBERT ANDREW
MACFIE, COPYRIGHT AND PATENTS FOR INVENTIONs 5-7 (1879) (documenting part of the legislative history
of the Statute of Anne, including the economic concerns of authors and printers and/or booksellers).
145. In an influential article defending the institution of copyright, one prominent author extended the
private welfare concern evident in the Statute of Anne to the U.S. copyright landscape. See Zechariah
Chafee, Jr., Reflections on Copyright: 1, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 505-15 (1945). According to Professor
Chafee, "[iut goes against the conscience of society that destitution should seize on the family of a man who
has made possible great public good." Id. at 508.
146. See SAMUEL EDGERTON BRYDGES, A Summary Statement of the Great Grievance Imposed on
Authors and Publishers; and the Injury Done to Literature by the Late Copyright Act, in FOUR TRACTS ON
COPYRIGHT 1817-1818 (Stephen Parks ed., 1974) (1818).
147. But see Mark Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REV. 873
(1997) (review of BOYLE, infra note 148). For historical studies of authorship, see Martha Woodmansee,
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be consistent with the utilitarian values inherent in the modern regime, 4" but
it unduly impedes social welfare by prescribing rights as though creativity is
a process divorced from social interaction. It therefore justifies a copyright
regime that precludes direct benefit from the copyrighted work unless such
benefit is paid for, or on other terms as stipulated by the copyright owner.
The creation of copyright was also the creation of commerce. The
property rights granted by copyright laws provided a mechanism for exchange
between authors and booksellers, thus facilitating the creation of a market in
literary works. The exchange enhanced the well-being of authors by
simultaneously rewarding them and promoting their industry, and increased
social welfare by ensuring the writing of books and thus securing the
"encouragement of learning." As a welfare goal, the "encouragement of
learning" or the "progress of science and the arts" was, and is, a judgment
about value (one of the principal factors in determining social welfare).'49
Indeed, in England the early debates about the question of literary property
often invoked questions about liberty, labor, and the "fairness" of allowing
individuals to profit from the intellectual industry of authors. "0 By the early
nineteenth century, the philosophy that it was only "natural" or "right" that
authors owned the produce of their minds was so firmly set in England as to
be without debate.'' Locke's theory of property no doubt influenced the tenor
The Genius and the Copyright: Economics and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the "Author, "
17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425 (1984); MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF
COPYRIGHT (1993); THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND
LITERATURE (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994).
148. See JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY 114-15 (1996).
149. See Arrow, supra note 69.
150. See, e.g., James Ralph, The Case ofAuthors by Profession or Trade Stated, in FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS AND THE LITERARY PROPERTY DEBATE, 1755-1770 (Stephen Parks ed., 1974) (1758). Ralph
criticized sentiments that authors, by trade, should not desire revenue from their works:
Thus a Man may plead for Money, prescribe or quack for Money, preach and pray
for Money, fight for Money, do anything within the Law for Money, provided the
expedient answers, without any least imputation. But if he writes like one inspired
from Heaven and writes for Money, the Man of touch in the right of Midas his great
Ancestor, enters his Caveat against him as a Man of Taste; declares the two
Provinces to be incompatible; that he who aims at Praise ought to be starved; and
that there ought to be so much drawback upon Character for every Acquisition in
Coin.)
Id. at 2.
15 1. See e.g., MACFIE, supra note 144; FRANCIS HARGRAVE, An Argument in Defence of Literary
Property (1774), in THE ENGLISH BOOK TRADE 1660-1853 21 (Stephen Parks ed,, 1974) (1774). This idea
was firmly rejected by Thomas Jefferson. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Issac McPherson (Aug. 13,
1813), in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 1015 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1943).
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of the theoretical justifications for recognizing a property right in books. 2
The copyright grant eroded the powerofthe bookseller's guilds and ultimately
overturned the system of monopolies and privileges that dominated the
production of literary works. 3 In this sense, the copyright grant to authors
represents a thread in the set of events that undermined features of the
mercantilist system, Antedating Smith's Wealth of Nations by sixty-seven
years, the Statute of Anne, and the literary property debates that preceded it,
anticipated one of the central tenets of Wealth of Nations-namely, a call for
policy reforms to enhance a particular vision of social welfare in a competitive
exchange economy based not on agriculture, but on capital.
3. Public Welfare
If specialization led to a maximization of wealth, then authors in
eighteenth-century England were the logical welfare choice for devolving the
property right to literary works. The property right ensured that market forces
would lead to transactions that benefit society as a whole. This hypothesis
was wholly consistent with Smith's invisible hand theory; after all, the writing
of books presumably was in everyone's best interest, so that in fact there was
a convergence of public and private interest. The contemporary articulation
of this phenomenon can be found in neo-classical economic justifications of
intellectual property. Simply, the general theory states that: (i) property
rights are incentives to authors and inventors to create; (ii) it facilitates
efficient market transactions by letting the market set the price of the creative
product; and (iii) it ensures a consistent supply of creative products at a price
that reflects the utility of the product to the consumer. In short, intellectual
property rules address the public goods problem inherent in intangible
property and remedy the market failure concern that in the absence of such
rules the market will fail to generate an optimal level of creative works absent
incentives to create. 5 4
152. See, e.g., HARGRAVE, supra note 151 (arguing for property rights in literary works and asserting
that the "first consideration" in the origin of such right is the author's labor in composing it), see also
Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law
of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993).
153. The maturation of this transformation took years. See ROSE, supra note 147.
154. See Ian E. Novos & Michael Waldman, The Effects of Increased Copyright Protection: An
Analytic Approach, 92 J. POL. ECON. 236,245 (1984) (analyzing claims by scholars that increased copyright
protection will increase social welfare due to optimal production, and providing supporting analyses for the
hypothesis).
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Casting copyright in property terms did not, however, resolve all questions
of public welfare. The development of a market, and the extension of
copyright beyond the basic prohibition to print another's work, transformed
the focus of the public welfare question from one of production to one of
consumption. Copyright was more than just an instrumentalist feature of
capitalist economies; from its genesis in Anglo-American and continental
discourses, copyright had a far weightier calling.' From the modest
beginnings of copyright, governments used the grant to accomplish a variety
of explicit and not so explicit social functions. The U.S. utilitarian emphasis
on intellectual property theory is an explicit normative decision, rooted in its
Founding Fathers' rejection of a natural right to creative works, but
constrained by the necessity of stimulating production of such works.
Similarly, the protection of moral rights in Europe serves an explicit welfare
function unrelated to the economic value engendered by creativity. Moral
rights reflect social and political values that inform the structure of the market
for creative works, while also bearing witness to dominant political and
cultural ideologies. The fact that copyright is more than just the sum of the
economic values it can generate is one marker of its social welfare function.
There has never been serious question that the protection of intellectual
property imposes certain costs to the public. The standard justification for
these costs has relied on another unquestioned assumption, namely, that the
system benefits public welfare by facilitating a steady supply of new ideas
expressed as inventions or creative works of authorship. In the digital context,
this justification is reframed as a matter of balance between the constitutional
mandate that the protection must promote progress, and the ultimate goal of
enhanced public welfare by facilitating access to protected works. 56
Recent scholarship has questioned the essentialism that underlies the
modern intellectual property systems,' including the specific requirements
of the individual categories of protection." 8 Some of the criticism questions
the legitimacy of the modern system in light of the historical forces that
shaped them,'59 while other scholarship has pointed to the limitations and
155. See Paul Abel, Copyright In International Perspective, I J. WORLD TRADE L. 399 (1967) (noting
that copyright was constructed universally as a "socially bound" right, combining social and individual
elements).
156. Novos & Waldman, supra note 154 (reasoning that there is little or no support for the claim that
increased copyright protection decreases social welfare due to underutilization of the works). The analysis
is based on cost considerations as the determinant of underuse of protected works.
157. See Gana, supra note II; Coombe infra note 160.
158. See Oddi, supra note 133 (on the requirement of nonobviousness in patent law).
159. See THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE,
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irrelevance of the system when transported out of Western liberal societies to
developing countries at the margins." More recently, scholars and activists
in anthropology and human rights have examined the role of indigenous
knowledge and its use as fodder for many multinational companies who
subsequently patent products that are a direct result of years of discovery and
use by indigenous groups. 6' In economics, scholars have advanced other
theories to explain national economic growth that are not related to the
presence or absence of innovation strategies.'62 And still, members of other
disciplines question the propriety of increased rights in intellectual property
without the benefit of public debate.'63 In a sense, scholarship from these
various disciplines are representative of a growing concern over the rabid
response to globalization that focuses almost exclusively on one category of
interests-namely, that of rights-holders-at the expense of other equally
compelling social objectives. The wisdom that impels a narrow focus on
rights-owners is not the wisdom that produced the U.S. intellectual property
system. More significantly, acquiescence to forces of globalization that exalt
ownership of private property owners over all else fundamentally alters the
role of the nation-State as the guardian of national public good. As observed
by a trade economist,
the most fundamental trade conflicts are not those between
home and foreign countries but those between different
interest groups within the same country. This is not
surprising when it is realized that trade protection is basically
supra note 147; James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail and
Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413 (1992); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The
Metamorphoses of "Authorship," 1991 DUKE L.J. 455.
160. See Rosemary Coombe, Left Out of the Information Highrway, 75 OR. L. REV. 237, 238, 245
(1996) (criticizing cultural dominance that is reinforced through wholesale application of intellectual
property laws in the information infrastructure of the global economy).
161. See, e.g., M. W. Serote et al., Initiatives for the Protection of Rights of Holders of Traditional
Knowledge, Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities, presented at WIPO Roundtable on Intellectual
Property and Indigenous Peoples, July 23-24, 1998, WiPO/INDIP/RT/98/4C; BOYLE, supra note 148, at
126-30.
162. Wassily Leontief, Factor Proportions and the Structure ofAmerican Trade: Further Theoretical
and Empirical Analysis, 38 REV. ECON. & STAT. 357 (1956); MICHAEL ROMER, A THEORY OF
ENDOGENOUS GROwTH (1998). See also supra note 61 and references cited.
163. See, e.g., Jonathan King & Doreen Stabinsky, Patents on Cells, Genes, and Organisms
Undermine the Exchange of Scientfic Ideas, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 5, 1999, at B6 (noting with
disapproval the commercialization of biological entities through an expansive patent policy and asserting
the need to curb this trend).
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an instrument for shifting income within a country from those
who use a product to those who produce it. Or stated
differently, the costs of protection are borne primarily not by
foreigners but by consumers and other adversely affected
domestic groups."
Ironically, intellectual property protection was identified as a subject of
international trade by the United States precisely because maintaining national
economic well-being required harnessing, not succumbing to, the force of
globalization.'6
4. Achieving "Welfare" Through Copyright
Once the strength of the U.S. economy shifted from industrial goods to
service and information goods, competition in information products gained
momentum. Reports of huge financial losses to the economy, allegedly caused
by copyright infringement, spurred the strengthening of the international
intellectual property system.'" The huge volume of trade in mass media
164. Frank, supranote 105, at 45.
165. The economic centrality of intellectual property in the United States can certainly not be
underestimated. Although public awareness of intellectual property rights and the recent legislative
initiatives enhancing protection for intellectual property have placed the subject matter squarely at the
forefront of national discourse, intellectual property has long been venerated as the vintage of U.S.
economic dominance both in the industrial and the information age. See supra note 8.
166. In a recent proposal for an interagency National Intellectual Property Coordination Center by
Senator Stevens (R-Alaska), the appropriations Committee claimed an $18 billion loss in revenue to the
U.S. economy due to intellectual property violations. See Page Putnam Miller, NCC Washington Update,
July 9, 1999 (visited Oct. 11, 1999) <http://www.h-net.msu.edu/-ncc/ncc99/ncc9924july99.html>. Figures
quoted as the size of dollar revenues lost to the U.S. economy are varied from industry to industry. The
recording industry, among others, which lobbied heavily for the TRIPS Agreement, reported losses in the
billions allegedly from piracy in developing countries. The software industry and movie industry reported
similar heavy losses. The Software Publishers Association (SPA) reported worldwide revenue losses due
to piracy in the software industry totaling an estimated $11.4 billion, with the United States leading the way
with losses totaling $2.7 billion. See Merle D. Kellerhals, Jr., Software Group says Piracy Hurts Jobs,
Revenue, Economy, Oct. 27, 1998 (visited Oct. 9, 1999) <http://www.usia.gov/topical/econ/ipr/ipr-
software.htm>. The International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) recently estimated losses
in the compact disc trade at $5.1 billion. See Worldwide Software Piracy Losses Estimated at $11.4 Billion
in 1997, Jun. 16, 1998, <http://www.bsa.org/pressbox/enforcement/e.ress._6.16.98_c.html>. The
International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) estimated that United States copyright-based industries
had losses totaling $17 billion due to piracy outside of the United States. See Tim Lister, World Music
Industry Cracking Down on Pirates, Jul. 27, 1998, available at <http://cnn.
com/SHOWBIZ/Music/9807/27/music.piracy> (last visited Oct. 9, 1999); Eric H. Smith, Worldwide
Copyright Protection under the TRIPsAgreement, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 559,569 (1996) (estimating
losses to the United States recording industry from piracy at $1.76 billion). It is difficult to judge the
validity of these claims. On one hand, there is no doubt that piracy of protected goods takes place. This
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products such as movies, compact discs, television programs, and software led
to a campaign by the industry to ensure that greater control over rights to
intellectual property goods were addressed at an international forum. The
pressure from private industry for heightened domestic protection of
copyright, in particular, was justified by repeated reference to the need to
maintain U.S. economic hegemony.'67 Heightened domestic protection
offered the opportunity to control and dominate the global marketplace,
specifically by expanding categories of protection and lengthening the term
of protection for the sake, purportedly, of enhancing national competitive
ability in the global market.
There is some plausible argument for more and stronger intellectual
property rights. Since globalization is dependent largely on the flow of
information-either as the subject of the transaction or ancillary to the use of
a product that is the subject of the transaction-the legal regime that protects
information, primarily copyright, is a factor of production. That is, copyright
is integral to the functioning of the process of globalization in regard to the
information technology industry that, in turn, is indispensable for all other
aspects of globalization. 6 " Information technology-as a source and
resource-is both the subject of, and provides a basis for, effective
globalization in virtually all spheres of activity.'69 Strategic trade policy in the
information market would suggest that an oligopolistic presence in the
information market will shift excess returns away from foreign to domestic
firms. But such a presence would also shift returns between firms in the same
country to the firm with the proprietary information. 7" In effect, only
is not the same as asserting, however, that pirated goods would have been purchased had they not been
pirated.
167. See Smith, supra note 166; see also Chandler, supra note 8.
168. Stephen J. Kobrin, The Architecture of Globalization, in GOVERNMENTS, GLOBALIZATION AND
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 137 (Dunning ed., 1997) [hereinafter GOVERNMENTS] (defining globalization
as the "technologically driven expansion of the scope of markets well beyond the limits of even the largest
national territories, and the replacements of markets and hierarchies by relational networks as the mode of
organization of international economic transactions"); see also Susan Strange, An International Political
Economy Perspective, in GOVERNMENTS, supra (Globalization is the "[tihe coinciding of acceleration of
internationalization of production, increased mobility of capital, and the greater mobility of knowledge or
information.") (emphasis added).
169. See generally Strange, supra note 168; see also Andrew Hurrell & Ngaire Woods, Globalisation
and inequality, 24 MILLENNIUM: J. INT'L STUD. 447 (1995) (noting that liberal views assume that
globalization is driven by technological advance).
170. See generally Murray C. Kemp & Shigemi Yabuuchi, The Role of Information in International
Trade Theory, in ECONOMIC THEORY, WELFARE AND THE STATE (Athanasiou Asimakopolus et al. eds.,
1991) (examining the viability of the Stolper-Samuelson and Rybczynski theorems when changes are made
to assumptions about the availability of technical information). The authors conclude that both theorems
survive a change in assumption from open to closed access to information, although in a slightly modified
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government policies that are directly applied, such as research and
development policy and export subsidies, can, under certain circumstances,
deter foreign firms-relative to domestic firms-from competing in markets that
are lucrative.'"' Further, the complexity of cross-national R&D investments,
and increased internationalization of R&D has, engendered a global
interdependence of science and technology policy so that notions of direct
government policies purely for domestic benefit are increasingly illusory. 72
Intellectual property policy would have the same effect on domestic and
foreign firms particularly given the limitations of the national treatment
principle.'73 While international trade rules constrain the scope and reach of
some domestic policies, the multilateral trade regime does not proscribe all
initiatives directed at supporting domestic industries. Indeed, some policies,
such as those taken to safeguard balance of payment difficulties, or those
necessary to protect essential security interests, are explicitly recognized by
the multilateral trade regime (under specific conditions) as legitimate
interventions in the market.'74 The precise reach of the limited exceptions to
rights protected by the TRIPS Agreement remains uncertain. What is clear,
however, is that in exchange for heightened intellectual property protection
under global rules, the United States failed to implement in the same
international system explicit welfare enhancing provisions for users, domestic
or otherwise.'75
The extensive preoccupation of the United States with intellectual
property as a main source of domestic economic growth is, in light of some
scholarly accounts, misplaced and ill fated-particularly in the absence of
supporting domestic policies necessary to ensure that gains from intellectual
property protection represent real rewards relative to the cost (to consumers)
of artificial supports such as research and development investments, tax
form. This conclusion supports the tenuous, but viable role of these theorems in analyzing the impact of
international intellectual property rules on the structure of the domestic market.
171. Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, International R & D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy, 50
REV. ECON. STUD. 707 (1983).
172. See David Mowery, The Global Environment of U.S. Science and Technology Policies, available
at Speaker Comments (visited Nov. 29, 1999) <http://www4.nas.edu/pd/harness.nsf/85256>.
173. The principle of national treatment is the cornerstone of the multilateral trade system. It requires
nations to treat goods from foreign firms the way it treats goods from domestic firms. Article Ill of the
TRIPS Agreement extends the national treatment principle to the protection of intellectual property.
174. See HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 66; see also General Agreement on Trade in Services of
the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay Round), Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M 44,46, 56-59 (1994)
(specifically, art. XII (restrictions to safeguard balance of payments), art. XIVbis (security exceptions); art.
XIV (recognizing general exceptions to the multilateral trade rules)).
175. For example, none of the global agreements contain an international fair-use principle.
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incentives, and other policies to stimulate innovation. First, empirical
evidence suggests that labor skills are a significant determinant of
international trade flows from the United States.'76 Indeed, an influential
series of articles by economist Wassily Leontief demonstrated that the United
States exports products, that require inputs of highly-skilled labor, and tends
to import goods representing low-skilled labor.' The Leontief study formed
the axis in the development of theories seeking to rationalize the strength of
exports in manufactured goods despite the high costs of U.S. labor. 78  It
concluded that the "high productivity of American labor, as opposed to
foreign labor, plays a decisive role in the determination of the composition of
those United States exports and imports which do not directly reflect the
presence or absence.., of certain natural resources."'
179
If labor skills are critical to the rate of exports, maintaining the quality and
size of the labor pool is indispensable for terms of trade, particularly if, as
policymakers parrot, goods subject to intellectual property rules constitute a
significant portion of the national economy. 80 Labor skills are, in turn,
inextricably bound to education policy. Government investments in education
determine to a great extent the quality and size of skilled labor available. In
an information economy, education policy will play a greater role than ever
before in determining growth in domestic real income, as technical skills
become indispensable for individual participation in the information
economy.'' Protecting intellectual property without a correlating investment
176. See Donald B. Keesing, Labor Skills and International Trade: Evaluating Many Trade Flows
with a Single Measuring Device, 47 REV. ECON. & STAT. 287 (1965) (stating that the availability of labor
skills determines patterns of international location and trade for products not tied to natural resources; the
author demonstrates empirically that the availability of labor skills strongly influences the pattern of
international trade in industrial goods).
177. See Wassily Leontief, Factor Proportions and the Structure of American Trade: Further
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 38 REV. ECON. & STAT. 386, 398-99 (1956) [hereinafter Leontief,
Factor Proportions]; Wassily Leontief, Domestic Production and Foreign Trade: The American Capital
Position Re-examined, PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC'y 97 (1953).
178. See Mordechai Kreinin, Comparative Labor Effectiveness and the Leontief Scarce-Factor
Paradox, 55 AM. ECON. REV. 131 (1965); Keesing, supra note 176.
179. Leontief, Factor Proportions, supra note 177, at 399.
180. See supra note 166.
181. President Clinton's National Information Infrastructure Advisory Council (NAIIAC) issued a
report in 1996 identifying three skills necessary for success in the workplace of the 21st century. These
skills are (I) the ability to read, write, perform arithmetic and mathematical operations, listen, and speak;
(2) the ability to think creatively, make decisions, solve problems, visualize, learn outside of the classroom
environment, and reason; and (3) personal qualities, including responsibility, self-esteem, sociability, self-
management, and integrity and honesty. The report adds: "Whether in the classroom, in a library, in a
community center, or at home, every American who goes online is acquiring many of these skills-often
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in education, and other policies specifically directed at macroeconomic
conditions, will not yield significant long-term benefits to the national
economy.
For example, a study by the Committee for Economic Development
(CED) during a time of economic downturn in the United States, suggested
changes in the regulatory climate to promote certainty, expanded government
support for basic research, and tax changes to improve the risks and rewards
in research and development." 2 The CED concluded that new policies to
stimulate innovation should concentrate on flagging business investment in the
economy,"8 3 suggesting that macroeconomic policies are indispensable for
sustained success in rates of domestic innovation. Recently, other studies
have emphasized the importance of capitalizing on investments in science and
technology.' The report made four recommendations including a
recommendation that the government should consider the education of
scientists and engineers an essential component of maximizing investments in
the national technology base." 5
The creation of intellectual property is initially a function of skilled labor
in the form of creative ideas. The manufacture of the final product, however,
is often capital intensive. This rarely is the case with copyright. Only the first
of the final product is likely to be capital intensive. Indeed, the heart of the
public goods problem is precisely that a minimal amount of capital is needed
to generate multiple copies of the protected work, so that absent copyright
protection, an author is unlikely to receive a return on her initial investment
of time, capital, and skill. It is for this reason that intellectual property law,
particularly patent law, is strongly justified with reference to the need for an
incentive to encourage investments in creative activity while also facilitating
recoupment of the capital invested by granting an exclusive right to the
patented product.
In the copyright context, an argument can be made that the production of
copyrighted works is equally capital intensive when considered from the point
of creation to the point of marketing the end product. The copyright allows
without knowing it." See NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE ADVISORY COUNCIL (NIIAC),
The KickStart Initiative, available at <http://www.benton.org/Library/Kickstart/kick.realizing.html>.
182. Robert C. Holland, The Committee for Economic Development Report on United States
Technology Policy, in TECHNOLOGY, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 79, 88-89 (Hugh
H. Miller & Rolf R. Piekarz eds., 1982).
183. See id. at 87.
184. COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, ENGINEERING, AND PUBLIC POLICY, CAPITALIZING ON INVESTMENTS IN
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (1999).
185. See id. at 56.
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the owner to recoup some of her investment. In addition, however, the right
to make derivative works'" tends to operate as a significant source of
monopoly power since derivative works occlude the prospect of perfectly
substitutable goods, which is precisely the goal. Thus, in some instances, the
labor factor (i.e., creativity) employed in the production of a copyrighted
product is likely to earn more than the capital employed to bring the creative
expression to the market. Put differently, the availability of copyright
protection raises the equilibrium real reward of skilled labor, and depresses
that of the other factor of production of copyrighted goods, namely capital.' 7
In theory, this suggests that the creators of the work, the authors, should earn
more than the publishers, and certainly more than non-skilled labor in the
economy. In order to achieve real growth from this situation, however,
macroeconomic policies must succeed in increasing the pool of skilled labor.
If not, the economic success of the nation vis-b-vis other nations may suggest
robustness, but in reality the domestic economy is shrinking as growth in real
income is concentrated only in one industry. Additionally, microeconomic
policies that affect rates of employment, capital availability, and other
economic strategies should be coordinated to maximize the potential for real
domestic growth. Economic success should be evaluated with reference first
to prevailing domestic conditions. Intellectual property rules designed to
advance public welfare must, consequently, balance exclusivity with access
in order to channel resources to other potential producers.' Instead,
however, the expansive scope of intellectual property rights attracts capital to
the same owners and industries as the equilibrium real reward of a narrow
class of skilled labor increases.
186. 17 U.S.C.A. § 103.
187. This is a simplified expression ofthe Stolper-Samuelson and Rybczenski theorems of international
economic theory. According to the Rybczenski theorem, any small increase in the endowment of one factor
of production, say labor, raises the output of the industry which uses that factor relatively intensely and
depresses the output of the other industry. The Stolper-Samuelson theory states that any increase in the
price of a commodity, raises the equilibrium real reward of the factor of production employed relatively
intensively in the industry that produces the commodity and depresses the equilibrium real reward of the
other industry. The theorems relate to a model which assumes one national economy in which two goods
are non-jointly produced by two primary factors of production under constant returns to scale. The
difficulty of quantifying which factor of production-labor, capital, or entrepreneurship-is responsible
mostly for goods protected by intellectual property make applications of these theorems difficult.
Additionally, the assumption ofconstant returns to scale are not applicable to the production of intellectual
property. However, in the context of international trade, these theorems provide a normative guide in
evaluating how proprietary ownership of information may in fact adversely affect assumptions underlying
the free trade model.
188. See infra Part II (discussing the prospect of secondary innovation by individuals other than the
first creator and the adverse impact of recent legislation on this prospect).
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Additionally, the role of domestic research and development investments
has proven influential in the specialization of U.S. firms in high technology
products. Economists have found a high correlation between the research
effort and trade position of industriess 9 as an explanation for economic
success. Such research and development policies or tax policies support
domestic industry but distort real market prices in high-tech goods.
Intellectual property rules add a further layer of distortion by fostering
imperfect competition between producers. The real problem is, however, that
imperfect competition resulting from intellectual property rules exists both in
the domestic and international market. The globalization of copyright, ol the
one hand, limits the scope of available policy options to encourage domestic
economic welfare, but, on the other hand,.allows certain types of distortions;
it makes no distinction between domestic economic welfare and global
economic conditions, and it strengthens imperfect competition in copyrighted
goods notwithstanding the negative effect on overall domestic market
conditions. Contemporary intellectual property policy, like trade policy,
"reflects a resolution of sectional interests in a political domain. There is no
necessary correspondence . . . between triumphant sectoral interest and
national interests ... [or between] . . . national interest and international
interest" where the latter must define the international trade system. 90
There must be a sustained and deliberate coordination ofmacroeconomic
policies to support the framework in which innovators can flourish and users
may benefit from introduction of new knowledge products. A marketplace
incapable of distinguishing between local and foreign firms must have
mechanisms structured to ensure that the benefits of innovation are captured,
at least in part, within the domestic economy. In a global context, both
developed and developing countries must be careful that rules that purport to
harmonize the rules of competition do not trump the welfare goals of national
systems designed to promote the public interest of its citizens. For developing
countries in particular Professor Reichman has, for example, stressed
maximum exploitation of ambiguities in the TRIPS Agreement to promote
189. See Gruber et al., The R & D Factor In International Trade and International Investments of
United States Industries, 75 J. POL. ECON. 20,22-23 (1967) (concluding that "the five industries with the
highest research effort are the five with the most favorable trade position" both in terms of the ratio of
exports to sales and the excess of exports over imports); Donald B. Keesing, The Impact of Research and
Development on United States Trade, 75 J. POL. ECON. 38 (1967) (concluding that "R&D explain
competitive trade success in manufacturing industries considerably better than any other variable tested").
190. BHAGWATI, supra note 44, at 56. See also Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the
Digital Millennium, 23 COLUM.-VLA J. L &ARTS 137, 178-79 (1 999) (observing that modem copyright laws
are made by affected industries).
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local inventiveness, utilization ofspillover effects of technology diffusion, and
establishment of intellectual property rules that appropriately balance the
interest between rights-holders and users.' 9 ' However, there is no universal
point of balance; each country must identify those interests that remain a
priority and coordinate its related policies-science, education, competition,
industrialization, research and development-accordingly.
In whole, U.S.'s economic success cannot be explained by reference to
any one policy or industry.'92 Indeed, the difficulty of prescribing any specific
mix of economic policy to guarantee or enhance future economic success is
due, in part, to the absence of historical antecedents; U.S.'s success is simply,
in part, a product of a series of historical accidents. Historical evidence
suggests that patent protection, in particular, has played a role in the success
of the U.S. economy from the late eighteenth century through the present. 93
In reality, however, innovation is an unstable basis for comparative
advantage.'94 The comparative advantage from any technology, particularly
information technology, is typically short-lived. Consequently, expansive
long-term intellectual property protection cannot provide a sure basis for
sustained economic growth.'95 Yet, even courts have yielded to the ideology
that intellectual property is primarily responsible for this success and must be
protected at all costs.'9 Further, no evidence so far has been adduced to
suggest that comparative advantage has equal utility as a basis for
international trade in an economy based not on manufactured goods, but on
information.
191. Reichman, infra note 202.
192. See generally, Richard Nelson, Technical Advance and Economic Growth 2, available at
<http://www4.nas.edu/pd/hamess.nsf/85256>.
193. See supra note Ill.
194. See e.g., Wm. A. Wulf, Remarks on the Education Challenge, National Forum on Harnessing
Science and Technology for America's Economic Future, Feb. 3, 1998, available at
<http://www4.nas.edu/pd/harness.nsf/85256> (criticizing the focus on buying computers just for use in
education, rather than fundamentally rethinking how to use technology to expand education. He points out
that given the rate of technological change, government expenditure should not be directed merely at
purchasing PC's). Id. at 3-4.
195. See Nelson supra note 192 ("[Tlhe process of technological advance involves uncertainty in a
fundamental way.... The fundamental uncertainty involved in technological advance seems to be the basic
reason why detailed, long range planning is doomed to frustration and often disaster, and why to get rapid
advance of technology, society generally needs a variety of different parties trying out different bets."). Id
at2.
196. In Rockvell Graphics Systems v. DEVindustries, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that
"[t]he future of the nation depends in no small part on the efficiency of industry, and the efficiency of
industry depends in no small part on the protection of intellectual property." 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir.
1991).
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5. Competing Ideals
Combining the industrial focus that was largely responsible for
internationalization with information technology that is largely responsible for
globalization, some scholars minimize the distinction between both
phenomena by arguing that internationalization leads to globalization as
contact between nations increases with the transcending of national borders.'97
Such contact involves information, financial capital, physical capital, labor,
goods, and services."" Clearly, information technology has enabled this
contact to affect nations all over the globe, notwithstanding disparate levels
of national participation' or disparate degrees of industry involvement.200
Thus, the argument goes, economic models that flourished in the international
era are just as easily applicable, and transferable, to the global, digitalized era.
This approach fails to acknowledge, much less examine, the possibilities that
the digitalized era may offer to expand our vision of welfare and, by so doing,
increase and secure welfare benefits in a season of enormous social and
economic activity. Despite the distinctions I have earlier articulated between
national and global welfare, this approach attempts to sustain and perpetuate
the same narrow vision of welfare at both national and global levels. In other
words, it reconciles the competing ideals by redefining welfare in terms that
197. See CLARK, infra note 293, at 19 (defining globalization as a more advanced form of
internationalization). Clark, however, also identifies the diminished role of national economies as a
distinguishing feature of globalization. See id. For a similar convergence between internationalization and
globalization, see NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF THE CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF U.S. MANUFACTURING, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION
OF U.S. MANUFACTURING 7 (1990) (defining internationalization as "[a] process by which global
manufacturing systems and networks of firms are interlocked in both formal and informal relationships
resulting in levels of global interdependence"); see also PETER DICKEN, GLOBAL SHIFT: THE
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 1 (1992); BRIGETrE UNGER & FRANS VAN WAARDEN,
CONVERGENCE OR DIVERSITY 13 (1995).
198. See UNGER& VAN WAARDEN, supra note 197 ("[T]his state of being can be considered global if
it concerns nations all over the globe.").
199. Despite differing estimates, a consensus has emerged that the United States accounts for the
greatest use of the Internet, specifically, the World Wide Web. Some estimates claim there are 36 million
household users in the United States constituting 62.8 percent ofthe on-line market. See GEORGE B. DELTA
& JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, LAW OF THE INTERNET, § 1.02, at 1-8 (1998) (citing Jupiter projects Global
Online Growth, DM NEWS, Nov. 25 1996, at 10). Others assert that 60 to 75 million adults have access to
320 million pages of information. See Thomas P. Novak & Donna L. Hoffman, Bridging the Digital
Divide: The Impact of Race on Computer Access and Internet Use, at I (visited Nov. 30, 1998)
<http://ecommerce.vanderbilt.edu/papers/race/science.html>.
200. See Stanley Hoffmann, The Crises of Liberal Internationalism, 98 FOREIGN POL'Y 175 (1995)
(expressing concern that the highest levels ofglobalization occur in the financial industry where, as a result
of instant communications ability, major transactions can occur globally).
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obviate the differences between national and global conditions. The
implications for this are attenuated by the fact that globalization has radically
transformed personal, communal, and national stakes in a world system
governed by technology.
The GATT was identified as the most effective forum for expanding
intellectual property rights for a number of strategic reasons: first, the
multilateral framework provided institutional support with strong enforcement
prospects; second, the question of free trade in services was sufficiently
related to the protection of intellectual property; and third, the trade
negotiations provided a context for ratcheting up rights in the protection of
intellectual property, an opportunity that would unlikely present itself in
WIPO which administers the other major international treaties for intellectual
property.
The significance of the Uruguay Round oftrade negotiations was reflected
in the dramatic international institutional changes that it engendered. The
Round introduced new subjects, such as intellectual property and services,
into the multilateral trade system; it established the World Trade Organization
(WTO) as the governing institutional body for administration of the system
and enforcement of the Agreement; and it created a new dispute resolution
process.2"' Once the rules and institutions were in place, the full force of
globalization was unleashed. The TRIPS Agreement established a "global
competitive framework" built around the international protection of
intellectual property. 2 In effect, the Agreement laid the foundation for
globalization; it "universalized the particular 20 3 by requiring commitment to
a set of intellectual property rules, derived exclusively from common practices
in developed countries, as the price for participation in the international
economy. In addition to a set of rules governing old categories of intellectual
property, the TRIPS Agreement also expanded the scope of protectable
subject matter.2" The central victory of the TRIPS Agreement, however, was
201. There is a wealth of scholarship on the accomplishments of the Uruguay Round. See generally
Symposium, Uruguay Round-GATT/WTO, 29 INT'L LAW. 335 (1995).
202. See generally J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under
the TRIPs Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 11 (1997).
203. See THE CULTURES OF GLOBALIZATION § XI, (Fredric Jameson & Masao Miyoshi eds., 1992)
(Globalization is "the particularization of the universal and the universalization of the particular.") (citing
ROLAND ROBERTSON, GLOBALIZATION: SOCIAL THEORY AND GLOBAL CULTURE 177-78 (1992)).
204. Previous international agreements for the protection of intellectual property focused on one of the
two major categories of intellectual property namely patents and copyrights. See, e.g., Berne Convention,
Sept. 9,1886,828 U.N.T.S. 221; Paris Convention, Mar. 20,1883,21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, as
revised July 14, 1972; Universal Copyright Convention, 6 U.S.T. 2731, 216 U.N.T.S. 134 (1952), revised
July 24, 1971,25 U.S.T. 1341,943 U.N.T.S. 178. In addition, there were other, less significant multilateral
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the inclusion of developing countries in an enforceable international system
for the protection of intellectual property, while simultaneously expanding
prosecutable subject matter and heightening levels of protection.2"5 Given the
failure of past arrangements to protect developed country interests in
intellectual property in developing countries, the TRIPS Agreement was an
important and necessary milestone in the move toward globalization and in
ensuring continued U.S. economic hegemony.2
Once the international rules were set in place, the focus turned to
strengthening intellectual property rights internally. This domestic turn, in
tandem with the international system, expanded marginalization to discrete
and disaggregated individuals, including a vast majority of United States
citizens, as well as citizens of developing countries.2", One of the profound
effects of globalization, therefore, is the determination of socioeconomic
status based on access to, or control of, information products.
The theory behind copyright and patent protection is in conflict with free-
trade principles in several regards. A true laissez-faire economy precludes
any kind of government intervention. Even the most ardent free-traders,
however, recognize exceptions to the principle of nonintervention. These
exceptions are, in turn, subject to the qualification that intervention to correct
market shortcomings is usually not the optimal or first-best option. Therefore,
once there has been intervention to address market failures, such intervention
should be tailored to avoid exacerbating the original market distortion. In
cases where market failure is massive, such as with intellectual property,
government intervention must seek to limit the costs of increased protection
of consumers. Expanding rights globally simply exacerbates the costs
associated with domestic market failure. Domestic market failure is best
addressed by domestic policy to countervail the failure without exacting a toll
agreements on other subjects loosely classified as, or associated with the protection of, intellectual property.
The categories of intellectual property governed by TRIPS are: (I) copyright and related rights; (2)
trademarks; (3) geographical indications; (4) industrial designs; (5) patents; (6) integrated circuit designs;
and (7) trade secrets and confidential information. See supra note 2.
205. See J.H. Reichman, Compliance with the TRIPs Agreement: Introduction to a Scholarly Debate,
29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 363, 366-67 (1996) (describing TRIPS as "the most ambitious international
intellectual property convention ever attempted").
206. The standard argument holds that a service economy requires strong rules of protection for the
source of its comparative advantage in the global market, namely, intellectual property. This argument
assumes, without establishing, that a service economy does, can, and should trade on the basis of
comparative advantage.
207. See Reichman, supra note 202, at 24-27 (noting that developed countries have increasingly
abandoned concerns of the welfare of their own constituents).
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on consumers. Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act,2"' for example, used to
counter intellectual property violations abroad, is an example of such a
domestic policy. Similarly, provisions in the Lanham Act. 9 prohibiting the
import of infringing products also correct market failure concerns at the root
without a disproportionate impact on public access to the goods at competitive
prices.
The very institution of intellectual property rights is a response to market
failure and the public goods problem associated with intellectual property.
The recent increase of the scope of protection for intellectual property only
amplifies the distortions caused by nonrivalrous goods, without a concomitant
policy to protect welfare. The welfare concern, in this context, relates to the
proposition that preserving a measure of balance between owners and users
of copyrighted goods, through fair use and copyright expiration, has served to
provide a resource for future creativity. Eliminating or greatly skewing this
balance by increasing rights for owners amplifies the underlying distortions
inherent in the market for intellectual property goods.
Free trade, and even its modified corollary, strategic trade, seeks to
promote production of goods at marginal cost so that consumption costs are
kept to a minimum. To this end, free trade seeks both a diversity of goods and
the price benefits associated with specialization. As Ricardo observed, "[n]o
extension of foreign trade will immediately increase the amount of value in a
country, although it will very powerfully contribute to increase the mass of
commodities and therefore the sum of enjoyments."2 ' Intellectual property
rules, however, assume that incentives are needed to encourage production.
The concern as such is not with efficient production (that is, how production
occurs) but rather with the fact of its occurrence. The general economic
formulation views "the objective of intellectual property protection [as the
creation of] incentives that maximize the difference between the value of the
intellectual property that is created and used and the social cost of its creation,
including the cost of administering the system." '' However, the explicit
objective of copyright and patent law is to promote the progress of science and
the arts by ensuring an optimal supply of copyrighted works." 2
208. 19 U.S.C. § 2486 (1994).
209. 15 U.S.C. § 1124(1994).
210. Ricardo, supra note 36, at 128.
211. Stanley M. Beson & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics ofIntellectual
Property, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 5 (1991).
212. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
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Traditionally, domestic intellectual property policy has dealt with the
public welfare question as one that simply requires calibrating the balance
between users and producers. In other words, how is innovation protected so
that innovators will keep on producing? The model assumes that the measure
of welfare is the abundance of new innovations available to the public.
However, an influential body of scholarship has demonstrated that high rates
of domestic innovation are more significant for determining levels of foreign
trade for the United States.21 3 Consequently, the domestic welfare question
is not limited to maximizing incentives to create, but rather, what level of
protection will have a positive impact on domestic consumption levels of the
product. This is particularly important for information and its associated
technologies, given its fundamental role in the global economy. As one
scholar argues:
Interest in innovation and technological change lies in the
potential they offer for welfare gain and the structural and
adjustment problems they inevitably bring with them. The
growth in the potential for social welfare, based on
consumption, depends over time on the growth of productive
potential, real incomes and the distribution of income.
Economic growth springs logically from growth in the quality
of productive inputs, improvements in their quality and
increases in the efficiency with which inputs are combined. 4
Thus, while trade theory focuses on efficient production to facilitate the end
of optimal consumption, intellectual property theory assumes this end or, at
best, assumes that the gains obtained from the fact of production is a sufficient
measure of welfare.
A further conflict between international trade and international intellectual
property is the fact that trade in innovation is beset by government
intervention, and this has been the case for at least the past fifty years. Indeed,
there is no such thing as "free" trade in high-tech industries. Incentives to
create, in the form of legal rules, are not the only factor in promoting
innovation. Industrial innovation policy, science policy, and education policy
213. See Keesing, supra note 176, at 287 (empirically demonstrating that the availability of labor skills
strongly influences the pattern of international trade in industrial goods).
214. Peter H. Hall, The Theory and Practice of Innovation Policy: An Overview, in TECHNOLOGY
INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC POLICY (Peter Hall ed., 1986) (emphasis added).
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have been equally significant factors. Since World War II, an eclectic mix of
domestic research and development subsidies,"' tax cuts, and other measures
aimed at encouraging industry has been the mainstay of the innovative process
for firms in the United States. Additionally, the government has been directly
involved in research through government-funded labs, government-sponsored
research endeavors, and joint alliances with educational institutions.1 6 What
is interesting about this web of subsidization is its acceptance by trade
theorists as inexorable. To counteract the distorting effects of such policies
on international trade in high-tech goods, Bhagwati suggests that an
international consensus be negotiated "on the desirability of achieving a broad
intra-sectoral balance of artificial advantages in a narrow range of industries"
to supplement the multilateral trade regime." 7 He advocates a fixed-rule
regime, in a multilateral context, which exposes the various ways in which
nations obtain comparative advantage in technology."' In sum, the question
of comparative advantage in technological products is manifestly irrelevant
to international trade in these products, in the absence of procedures to
determine the level and impact of artificial supports. Claims that the United
States has a comparative advantage in technology are not consistent with
Ricardo's factor endowments or Smith's invisible hand. Instead, comparative
advantage, to the extent it is maintained, is the result of a complex, often
uncoordinated blend of legal entitlements in the form of intellectual property
rights, government policy in areas such as science and education, tax schemes,
and through direct government sponsorship of research. Thus, the claim that
the absence of adequate intellectual property systems in other countries
distorts the flow of international trade because it unfairly erodes the United
States' comparative advantage is, at best, specious. Ironically, although the
hypothesis may ostensibly rationalize the union between intellectual property
and trade, while reinforcing the primacy of laissez-faire economics, the
empirical evidence suggests that government intervention in the high-tech
industry represents a significant deviation from the free trade ideal.
215. See Keesing, supra note 176; Gruber et al., supra note 189.
216. In particular, since the early 1980s, the government has utilized a systematic policy to encourage
research alliances between public and private industries. The Bayh-Dole Act was the legislative
embodiment of this policy. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211 (1988).
217. See BHAGWATI, supra note 44, at 44-47.
218. See id. An evaluation of the merits or otherwise of this proposal is beyond the scope of this paper.
Suffice it to say that macroeconomic policies that interfere with the free market are nonetheless acceptable
under the current multilateral trade regime.
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The principle of comparative advantage is partly premised on the fact that
trade occurs because people benefit from exchange. It assumes a perfectly
competitive market, which, as economists have repeatedly demonstrated, is
simply not the case with international trade.2 9 Since intellectual property
rights are implicated only in respect to a sole actor-the author or owner-and
since both categories preclude others from creating substitute goods at the
same utility levels,22 an international "market" for copyrighted goods is an
example of a purely imperfect market. This market imperfection should
constitute strong basis for government policy that corrects the disequilibrium.
Instead, international trade rules limit the scope of intervention possible.22" '
And, in any event, any policy adopted would, under the principle of national
treatment, have to be extended to actors from other countries, thus eliminating
any advantage to the domestic economy of such welfare-enhancing policies.
Finally, there is the question of how social welfare is determined. Those
who would argue that the heightened protection of intellectual property is in
the best interest of the nation perceive, only dimly, the long-term effects of
such a premise. Intellectual property became a trade issue because interest
groups captured the political process and subverted it to their private
agendas.222 This tendency is a prime example of the weaknesses of the
political process and the reason Smith decried voting (political measures) as
a means of achieving efficient (and in his view, welfare enhancing) results.223
Even if one would cede that heightened protection benefitted the nation in
some skeletal way, if the resulting growth from undistorted trade (now that the
source of the distortion is fixed) will concentrate increased incomes entirely
among the affluent, with no corresponding upward mobility, then intellectual
property policy in this configuration gives a zero rate of return to society. Put
differently, if growth is immeserizing to the poor who need it the most, then
219. See Krugman, supra note 46; BHAGWATI, supra note 44.
220. Both patents and copyright protection preclude copying. While leaks in the system may yield
patents around the original product, the right to make derivative works makes this possibility unlikely in
copyright law.
22 1. See supra note 206. See Geoff Weinstock, WTO Rules Against U.S. on Tax Break: Incentive on
U.S. Exports Deemed Illegal Subsidy; Decision isn't Last Word, WALL ST. J., July 27, 1999 at A14;
Reichman & Lange, supra note 3.
222. For a vivid account of how this rent-seeking behavior transcended national political process, see
Samuelson, supra note 106.
223. See SMITH, supra note 19 at 47 1. Smith's concern with sectoral pressures is evidenced thought
Wealth of Nations.
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the return on that activity is zero.224 Thus, while the poor, like developing
countries, have benefitted from innovation, they have nonetheless stayed poor.
The economics of welfare is vital to the success of the domestic information
economy. This welfare is, in turn, directly impacted by the policies that
regulate the use and disposition of information. The heightened protection of
intellectual property through the international trade regime relegates domestic
welfare to a "rule of thumb" and not the raison d'6tre of the copyright system.
The interjection of copyright protection in the trade regime raises serious
theoretical problems with the free trade ideal and leaves little room for
domestic initiative.
II. (RE)ENVISIONING PUBLIC WELFARE IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT
This section continues with the question of whether the theory of welfare
gains through international trade, which reached its peak in post-World War
II international trade literature, is synonymous with the advance of public
welfare explicitly mandated in the U.S. Constitutional clause respecting
copyright laws. In particular, I critique the assumption that international
copyright laws extend any perceived national welfare gains to other countries
in the global economy.2
224. See Jagdish Bhagwati, Distortions and Immiserizing Growth: A Generalisation, 35 REV. ECON.
STUD. 481 (1968). See also, e.g., Helping the Third World, ECONOMIST, June 26, 1999, at 23, 24. "GDP
is not a foolproof measure of well-being. Wealth may be unevenly spread, so that a high average disguises
widespread wretchedness. Nor does GDP take account of the hidden costs of pollution, for example." Id.
225. The prevailing philosophical perspective in international intellectual property negotiations has
been that the protection of intellectual property rights are in the best interests of both developed and
developing countries. This did not change in the context of the TRIPS negotiations. See, e.g., Gerald J.
Mossinghoff, The Importance of Intellectual Property Protection in International Trade, 7 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 235,249 (1984) (concluding that steps by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to increase
worldwide protection of intellectual property rights will strengthen trade opportunities for all nations and
increase developing country access to new technology); Robert W. Kastenmeier & David Beier,
International Trade and Intellectual Property: Promise, Risks and Reality, 22 VAND. J. TRANSN'L L. 285,
305 (assessing potential costs and benefits of a trade-based intellectual property agreement and concluding
that "Ithe inclusion of intellectual property in the GATT ... represents a concrete opportunity to improve
the international trading system"). But see Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, TRIPs: Background, Principles
and General Provisions, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 9, at 8
(stating that the GATT connection was insisted upon by developed countries not on the basis of liberal trade
ideology but as a bargaining chip for access by developing country's products to markets of the developed
nations). See also Reichman, supra note 13 1, at 23 (making the same observation).
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A. Marginalization and Social Costs
If the international system produced "hierarchy" in political relations, and
"unevenness ''2 26 in economic progress between States, globalization is
responsible for extending the reach of inequality to groups and individuals at
an unprecedented level. Thus, while globalization may offer dim hopes of
stabilizing international political order, or at least of making relationships
between States less relevant for global economic progress, it transforms
inequality, or "unevenness," into the orthodoxy of global citizenship. In other
words, "unevenness" is the common, indomitable feature of supranational
interaction-"the asymmetrical effects of... globalization on the life-chances
and well-being of peoples, classes, ethnic groupings, movements and the
sexes." 227 The asymmetries are correlated with geography, race, gender, and
poverty. Accordingly, marginal ization- traditionally reserved for countries
at the margins and their citizens, or for racial minorities and others excluded
from power and who lack access to enabling resources such as capital or
education-is now extended to include those who are excluded from access to
computers, and the associated benefits such as electronic mail and the Internet.
In sum, marginality is a phenomenon that transcends national borders even as
it reflects inequities within nations.228
Recent studies in the United States show that there is a significant gap
between the "haves" and the "have-nots" with regards to access to information
and information products. 229 For example, empirical evidence suggests that
Caucasians are significantly more likely than African-Americans to have a
home computer and to have access to a computer at work. An evaluation of
access to information on the Internet, defined in sociological terms to include
skills such as the ability to read, write, and type, will likely reveal even more
significant disparities. Addressing this gap has become a significant social
concern for the Clinton Administration, spawning national policies,
community initiatives, and coalitions of interest groups for the express
purpose of facilitating equal access to information goods.23 The question of
access, broadly defined, implicates State responsibility to allocate resources
226. See HELD, supra note 2, at 80 (internal citation omitted).
227. Id. at 81.
228. See id.
229. Access here is defined narrowly in terms of computer access. See Novak & Hoffman, supra
note 199.
230. See id. at 3.
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in a way that ensures that the social dividends contemplated by the
proliferation of information goods is, in fact, a realistic prospect for all
citizens. Basic goods, such as education and employment, are indispensable
raw materials in the quest to eliminate unevenness in the national and global
economy.23' These building blocks of successful participation in the global
economy continue to remain the purview of political governments. The
theoretically diminutive role of nation-States in the process of globalization
should not be mistaken to mean that States are therefore irrelevant to the
ability of individuals and groups to harness the productive forces and
economic dividends ofglobalization. For countries and groups at the margins,
the State is still an indispensable source and determinant of social and
economic enablement, and it is via State action that public welfare must be
guarded.232
In the United States, the "digital divide" has attracted ambitious policies
directed specifically at bridging the gap.233 The Clinton Administration has
targeted several important objectives to ensure that "every 12-year-old can log
onto the Internet."234 At the same time as these government initiatives were
underway to ensure opportunities for all U.S. citizens to participate in the
global information economy, the 105th Congress was busily expanding
protection for intellectual property owners. Several bills were introduced to
Congress, designed to increase current levels of statutory protection for
copyright in a variety of ways.25 For example, the Sonny Bono Copyright
Term Extension Act 36 provided an increase in the term of copyright, from life
of the author plus fifty years, to life plus seventy years. 237 Theoretically,
extension of the copyright term has at least two immediate effects. First,
copyright extension prolongs the length of time during which the public must
depend on the vicissitudes of the copyright owner's terms for using the
231. See id. at 2 (noting that formal access (i.e., access to a computer) is strongly correlated with
income and education). The authors also note that as income level increases, disparities between the races
lessen significantly with regard to such access. See id. at 4.
232. See Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 54 (1994)
(advocating that the Copyright Office, a government agency, should view the public as its client and thus
attend to the problem of how the move towards greater rights might destabilize the balance in the copyright
bargain to the detriment of the public).
233. See Novak & Hoffman, supra note 199, at 3.
234. Id. See also Statement of The National Forum on Harnessing Science and Technology for
America's Economic Future, available at <http://www4.nas.edu/pd/harness.nsf/85256> (iterating the
importance that all regions and groups in the U.S. share the benefits of new technology).
235. See supra note 6.
236. See Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).
237. See id.
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copyrighted work while continuing to pay for such use.235 Second, copyright
extension shrinks the size of the public domain from where others may freely
draw from previously protected works. As many scholars have pointed out,
the public domain is a resource for future authors and creators, 239 and it is
sustained by the expiration of copyright. 240  Copyright extension only
encourages creativity, if at all, for a select group of authors. However, the
number and variety of works produced, as well as the diversity of authors in
any society, all serve the welfare goals of intellectual property.21  Copyright
extension potentially endangers them all as well. 24
2
In addition to the Copyright Term Extension Act, other legislation further
amends the 1976 Copyright Act by delineating restrictive terms that will
govern what those who have access can read, "borrow," and productively
employ.
24 3
238. Landes & Posner (supra note 115, at 363) present an economic analysis of copyright extension.
They argue against retroactive extension of the copyright term on grounds that the incentive only exists for
works not yet produced. Yet, the cost to consumers will apply to borrowing from all the works, existent
and nonexistent. See generally William Patty, The Failure of the American Copyright System: Protecting
the Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 907 (1997), reprinted in WILLIAM F. PARTY, THE FAILURE OF THE
AMERICAN COPYRIGHT SYSTEM: PROTECTING THE IDLE RICH (Occasional Papers in Intellectual Property
No. 2, 1997).
239. See BOYLE, supra note 148, at 363; Litman, supra note 119, at 968. See generally Coombe, supra
note 160.
240. See Litman, supra note 119.
241. The protection of derivative works already serves to curtail new forms of expression in protected
works by reserving such right to make derivative works for the creator of the first work. Copyright
extension exacerbates the transaction costs of bargaining for nonexistent works and may result in market
failure for works in which authors/creators fail to exercise the right to make derivative work. But see
Landes & Posner, supra note 115, at 363 (arguing that long terms of protection may serve as incentives for
people to work in order to leave a bequest for family members). In this regard, underutilized derivative
rights may be a source of income for future heirs and heiresses.
242. See id. at 340-41 (arguing that an increase in copyright protection is likely to reduce welfare
benefits (defined as consumer surplus plus producer surplus) from a given work). The increase in the cost
of creating the work and in the cost to copiers due to such extension are likely to be greater than the savings
generated by shifting the production of legitimate copies from others to the author. See id The difference
will be greater (as will be the welfare loss) the lower the author's marginal cost of production. See id. This
is because a cost increase occasioned by copyright extension will affect all copies produced by others, while
the savings from production by authors affects only the additional units the author chooses to supply. See
id. Landes and Posner go on to assert, however, that total welfare depends on the number of works created,
which may increase as copyright protection is expanded. See id. They disagree with the traditional model
which emphasizes increased price as the source of welfare decreases from copyright extension, but agree
that welfare is likely to fall due to such extension. See id.
243. See Digital Millenuim Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
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B. An Overview of Copyright Legislation for the Global Economy
1. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)244
Prior to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations, movement was underway to identify specific copyright concerns
engendered by the development of digital technology. As early as 1988, the
European Commission published a report that surveyed the challenges posed
to the copyright system by digital technology.24 In addition, the World
Intellectual Property Organization246 began preparing for diplomatic
conferences aimed at supplementing the principal international copyright
treaty, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works.247 The proposals that were the subject of the diplomatic conference
all included responses to the concerns raised by digital technology.248
The diplomatic conference resulted in two significant international treaties
supplementing the Berne Convention.249 The WIPO Copyright Treaty 25 ° and
the WIPO Performances and Phonogram Treaty2"' are intended to address the
challenges posed by new digital technology, in particular the regulation of the
distribution of copyrighted works over global technological systems. The
DMCA implements the WIPO treaties and purportedly "balances the interests
of both copyright owners and users. "252 Section 1201 of the WIPO Copyright
244. On October 28, 1998, President Clinton signed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, H.R. 2281,
into law.
245. See Green Paper on Copyright and the Challenge of Technology: Copyright Issues Requiring
Immediate Action, COM (88)172 final at 3.
246. See WIPO Convention, supra note 130. WIPO became a specialized agency ofthe United Nations
in 1974.
247. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886 828
U.N.T.S. 221.
248. The three proposed treaties were: (1) Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty
on Certain Questions Concerning the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works to Be Considered by the
Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions, WIPO Doc. CRNRIDC/4
(Aug. 30, 1996); (2) Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty for the Protection of the
Rights of Performers and Producers of Phonograms to Be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference, WIPO
Doc. CRNR/DC/5 (Aug. 30, 1996) [hereinafter WIPO Performances and Phonogram Treaty]; (3) Basic
Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Databases to
be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference, WIPO Doc. CRNRIDC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996). See generally
Samuelson, supra note 106 (chronicling the origins of the United States Digital Agenda in regard to these
treaties and the ultimate outcome at WIPO).
249. See Samuelson, supra note 106.
250. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 14.
251. WIPO Performances and Phonogram Treaty, supra note 248.
252. See Hearing on S. 1284 & H.R. 2441 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property
of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Bruce A. Lehman, Asst. Secretary of
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Treaty prohibits circumvention of technological protection measures that
control the user's access to protected works. This Section also prohibits the
manufacture, import, offer to the public, provision of, or trafficking in any
technology, product, service, or device designed primarily to circumvent the
technological measure put in place by a copyright owner." 3 Thus, Section
1201 allows copyright owners to police their copyright rights to an extent that
dilutes the rights of users in the new digital milieu.2""
First, the anti-circumvention provision is unprecedented in the history of
intellectual property policy and portends a chilling impact on the use of
copyrighted material on information technology networks such as the Internet
and its related applications. Intellectual property policy has typically been
construed in favor of producing new technology, even where such technology
has possible infringing use or where such technology, in fact, offends other
policies for social welfare norms.2"' For example, in Sony Corporation of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,256 the manufacturers of video cassette
recorders (VCRs) were sued by movie studios who claimed that consumers
bought VCRs and used them to tape movies and television shows. The
lawsuit alleged contributory infringement by the manufacturers. The United
States Supreme Court held that uses of the new technology yielded societal
benefits including expanded public access to freely broadcast television
programs. 27 The Court expressly acknowledged the public interest in making
broadcasting more available,25 ' although cautioning that such public interest
is not unlimited. In conclusion, the Court held that the substantial
noninfringing uses made possible by the new technology did not constitute a
copyright infringement of the movies.259 In effect, Congress through the
Commerce and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks) [hereinafter Hearing].
253. See id.
254. See Julie E. Cohen, Copyright andthe Jurisprudence ofSetf-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089,
1090 (1998) (criticizing a similar "self-enforce[ment] of private ordering" of proposed former Article 2B
of the UCC).
255. While the DMCA does include provisions designed to preserve a minimum level of fair use, the
argument here is that the anticircumvention law has a chilling effect on use if not on creativity. Clearly this
chilling effect tips the traditional balance between users and owners of copyrighted work in favor of the
latter.
256. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
257. See id.
258. See id. at454 (citing Southern Cal. v. Gottfried, 459 U.S. 498, 508 n.12 (1983)).
259. The majority argued that copyright should not confer rights over an emerging market for a new
technology. The Court's opinion is justified by the volume of video rentals and sales that has, in fact,
generated significant profits for the movie industry.
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DMCA purports to "promote the progress of science and the arts" by banning
a whole category of new inventions.
Another source of concern regarding the DMCA's impact on users' rights
is the subtle shift of regulatory power from institutions such as the Copyright
Office,2" and from traditional judicial enforcement by courts to the copyright
owner. In other words, the DMCA creates a shift from public enforcement to
private enforcement through technological means. One may assume that a
positive externality of the DMCA will be the creation of a market for
technological "wraps," that is, technological mechanisms for preventing
access to copyrighted works. However, the DMCA precludes the creation of
technological works that have, as a primary purpose, the avoidance of the
wraps that have been put in place by a copyright owner.26' While there is still
a marginal incentive to create such wraps even though circumventing them is
illegal, the potential economic value of Sony is diminished with respect to a
market for anticircumvention technology.
The DMCA contains a limited exemption for non-profit libraries,
archives, and educational institutions.262 This limitation permits a good faith
inquiry or access to a commercially exploited copyright work in order for the
institution to determine whether or not to acquire a copy of that work. This
limitation on copyright rights, however, contains a further limitation on the
user library, namely, that the copy may not be retained for longer than
necessary to make the determination of whether or not to purchase,263 and the
copy may not be used for any purpose other than this specific determination.2
In addition, the exemption for such institutions is applicable only when an
identical copy of the work is not reasonably available in another form. The
transaction costs imposed on accessing copyrighted works in the global
technological framework for such institutions will simply outweigh the value
of that access. As a result, it is likely that most libraries and institutions will
continue to access copyrighted works in the traditional means. In effect, the
DMCA gives with one hand what it takes away with the other.
260. See Litman, supra note 232, at 29 (1994) (suggesting that copyright office is the appropriate legal
voice for the public interest). The DMCA does shift regulatory power to the Copyright Office. Given the
substance of the law, however, this does not imply a shift towards the public interest.
261. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 1999).
262. Id. § 1201(d)(1).
263. Id. § 1201(d)(IXA).
264. Id. § 1201(d)(1)(B).
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The DMCA, by making it illegal to circumvent technology that a
copyright owner uses to prevent access to the copyrighted work, does not
discriminate between attempted uses that are consistent with the public
welfare goal and those that are illicit. Fair use, which provides free access
under limited conditions to the copyrighted work, is undercut by the DMCA
whenever copyright owners use technological safe boxes to hide their works.
In summary, the DMCA chills both the use of copyrighted works and the
creation of enabling mechanisms to access such copyrighted works. More
significantly, the DMCA patently alters the focus of copyright legislation and
policy from the public interest to the private gaih of copyright owners.265 It
is difficult to discern any public interest goals implicit in the DMCA and any
corresponding balance between interests of owners and users of copyrighted
works. If, as the Clinton Administration asserts, the DMCA has a balancing
mechanism, it is not yet apparent.
Finally, there may be some due process arguments to be made regarding
the anticircumvention provision. In particular, it is almost impossible for the
average copyright user to know if and under what circumstances a
technological product, device, or service has only "limited commercial value"
and whether it is "primarily designed or produced for the purpose of
circumventing technological protection." '266 Nevertheless, the DMCA makes
it a violation to traffic in such technology without requiring intent as an
element of liability.
265. Again, the invisible hand is invoked. Those in support of greater protection would argue that what
is good for the creator of the work is good for the consumer. But as Say observed of a similar mercantilist
argument:
What, then are the classes of the community so importunate for prohibitions of
heavy import duties? The producers of the particular commodity, that applies for
protection from competition, not the consumers of that commodity. The public
interest is their plea; but self-interest is evidently their object. Well, but, say these
gentry, are they not the same thing? Are not our gains national gains? By no means:
whatever profit is acquired in this manner, is so much taken out of the pocket of a
neighbour and fellow citizen; and if the excess charge thrown upon consumers by
the monopoly could be correctly computed, it would be found, that the loss of the
consumer exceeds the gain of the monopolist. Here then, individual and public
interest are in direct opposition to each other; and since public interest is understood
by the enlightened few alone, is it at all surprising that the prohibitive system should
find so many partisans and so few opponents?
JOHANNES OVERBEEK, FREE TRADE VERSUS PROTECTIONISM: A SOURCE BOOK OF ESSAYS AND READINGS
(Edward Elgar ed., 1999).
266. See Hearing, supra note 252; see also 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(A). Several scholars have already
pointed out the dangers of the "tax-codization" of copyright law, namely that citizens will now need lawyers
to interpret the new law. See Litman, supra note 232.
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2. The Proposed Database Bill
In 1988, the European Commission issued a "green paper." This green
paper framed important digital issues regarding protection of copyright
owners. The first issue was a directive related to the legal protection of
computer programs and databases. The European Union presented its
database treaty proposal in Geneva at the 1996 diplomatic conference of a
committee of experts on a possible protocol to the Berne Convention.2 67 In
1997, the European Union issued its database directive. This directive called
for the creation of a new form of intellectual property protection for the
contents of databases. In addition, the European Union included a reciprocity
provision providing that databases would not be protected in the European
Union unless legislation in the home country also provided for database
protection. This reciprocity provision galvanized the United States to action
in a bid to secure protection for U.S. database providers.2 68 Accordingly, the
protection of databases was included as part of the United States agenda at the
WIPO Treaty negotiations.
The protection of databases is again unprecedented in U.S. history and is,
at least, in tension with prevalent theoretical justifications of the U.S.
intellectual property system. In Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone
Service, 69 a utility company, whose subscriber list was copied by Feist, sued
the publishing company that specialized in area-wide telephone directories for
copyright infringement. The United States Supreme Court held that no
copyright protection exists for facts.270 The Court acknowledged that
compilations of facts, while copyrightable, nevertheless require originality.27'
Copyright protection in such compilations is said to be "thin" because users
may freely use the facts that are not copyrightable so long as the compilation
with its requisite originality or creativity is not copied.
267. See generally Mihaly Ficsor, Copyright for the Digital Era: The WIPO "Internet'" Treaties, 21
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 269 (1998); see also P. Bernt Hugenholtz Implementing the European
Database Directive (unpublished paper presented at the Sixth Annual Conference on Intellectual Property
Law and Policy, Apr. 16 & 17, 1998); Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
I I Mar. 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L77) 20.
268. See Senator Howard Coble, The 1 05th Congress: Recent Developments in Intellectual Property,
22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 269 (1998).
269. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
270. See id. at350-51.
271. See id.
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The Database Protection Bill raised significant concerns at the domestic
level. In particular, there was concern from the National Committee of
Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the National Institute of
Medicine about the implications of such a database proposal on basic
research. These concerns were significant enough to thwart efforts to sign and
conclude negotiation of an international database treaty.272 Currently, a
database bill remains in the U.S. Congress.273 The DMCA, the Copyright
Term Extension Act, and the specter of a database bill evoke Boyle's
description of an "intellectual land grab."274  The apparent unceasing
expansion of intellectual property laws impoverishes the public at least in the
sense of curtailing the public domain and in imposing greater costs on access
and use of copyrighted material. This result requires attention if we are to
take seriously the Clinton Administration's desire to open the information
superhighway to all U.S. travelers.
The globalization of information offers a vast array of opportunities for
all, irrespective of race, creed, or national origin. For the first time,
technology has the potential to neutralize inequities based on gender and race
and to make such factors irrelevant in the calculation of opportunities
available for economic advantage. However, copyright and its associated
rights, together with other intellectual property laws, both national and
international, will in fact prevent the full exploitation of the opportunities that
globalization offers. There is a desperate need to reinvent existing models of
what constitutes and contributes to public welfare, especially in light of the
multiple, complex, overlapping, and sometimes inconsistent role that
information plays in economic life. As one scholar put it, "[t]he economic life
is the basis of social progress, but the economic environment which conditions
this life is fast becoming an artificially created environment. In the creation
of this environment there is a continually growing sphere for the conscious
activity of the social group. 27 5
It is important that developed and developing countries caught in the
matrix of international agreements, and perhaps impelled by the feverish
excitement over global information technologies, take care in evaluating what
social and economic doctrines will be embedded in their domestic copyright
systems. For the United States, the force of the recent tidal wave of
272. See Samuelson, supra note 106.
273. See supra note 6.
274. JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY 125 (1996).
275. EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, Economics and Social Progress, in ESSAYS IN ECONOMICS 302 (1925).
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legislation strengthening intellectual property has, at a minimum, significantly
retrenched the public welfare goals implicit in intellectual property policy, if
not sacrificed them on the altar of globalization.276 It is indeed ironic that the
very technology that has the potential of truly evening out the playing field is
the. same technology that may widen the gap between the "haves" and the
"have-nots." It is even more ironic that a global effect of greater domestic
protection is the standardization of disadvantages and of heightened
intellectual property protection between people who are geographically,
ideologically, culturally, and politically distinct.277
III. THE GLOBALIZATION OF OWNERSHIP AND PUBLIC WELFARE
In the wake of the rapid growth in the use of global communication
networks such as the World Wide Web, lawmakers were persuaded that the
new technology made infringement of works easier and, therefore,
strengthened rights were imperative to preserve this balance.27 This
technology-based justification for greater rights does not, however, address
two questions that are fundamental to copyright policy. First, will greater
rights necessarily result in more creativity? Second, what costs are involved
in giving greater rights and what social welfare gains are ultimately
sacrificed? There is no question that the protection of intellectual property
yields economic and social welfare gains. Even in an age of increasing
protection for authors, U.S. policy ostensibly remains committed to enhancing
public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors.279 This historic
policy is responsible for the balance of interests that is inherent to copyright
276. The substantive expansionism evident in recent intellectual property laws are impelled and
justified in persistent reference to the importance of remaining competitive intemationally. In addition, for
the United States, there is the constant specter of remaining in Europe's shadows. Consequently, once the
European Directive expanding copyright term was passed, Congress immediately began to contemplate
doing the same. See generally Senator Coble, supra note 268 (discussing legislative proposals before the
105th Congress). This growing tendency to respond, through legislation, to events outside of the United
States can and should aptly be termed the "globalization of American intellectual property law."
277. See Aoki, supra note 3 (making the point that citizens of the Ivory Coast are beginning to share
more in common with U.S. citizens with respect to the globalization of intellectual property rights).
278. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(A) (Supp.1999); Digital Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112
Stat. 2860 (1997); Hearing, supra note 252.
279. A close examination of copyright history reveals the determination ofthe United States, very early
on, to encourage the development of writing within the country. As a result, U.S. copyright policy at one
time explicitly encouraged the piracy of European books with the express purpose of ensuring that the
public had access to literature. There is some evidence that some European countries also encouraged
piracy to facilitate access by their citizens to works of authorship. See generally SAM RICKETSON, THE
BERNE CONVENTION FOR PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986, 18-20(1987).
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law.2"' The recent laws proposing or granting increased copyright protection
clearly are attributable to globalization. These proposals will continue to be
challenged by scholars and others who see a significant threat, if not the entire
demise, of this balance of interests.2 '
It is evident that new legislation, in providing heightened levels of
copyright protection, fails to address the economy of globalization. In other
words, the legislative agenda, on the whole, assumes that the focus of the
public welfare in a global era remains unchanged; simply providing even
greater incentives for creativity satisfies welfare goals. This narrow view of
public welfare is problematic for several reasons. Even if public welfare is
satisfied simply by legislative measures to ensure a steady stream of works of
authorship, it is unclear that in a global economy where information is readily
available in large volumes, such authors or creators can recoup the value of
the so-called incentive to create. Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest
that the economy of globalization, stimulated by information, may operate to
harm creators in their attempts to make a livelihood and not help them." 2
It is interesting to note that this recent wave of domestic legislation in the
United States is aimed primarily at domestic users, even though the impetus
for the legislation stemmed from international treaties.2"3 However,
heightened protection at the domestic level will not automatically transfer
across national borders, thus engendering a situation where non-U.S. citizens
may enjoy the status quo of "minimality" established under the TRIPS
Agreement, at least in the short-term, while U.S. citizens are subject to higher
standards and, consequently, higher costs. Finally, the history of copyright
protection shows that the concern for public welfare was not simply one of
availability, but of the terms of availability, since the ultimate constitutional
280. According to Professor Chafee,
[C]opyright is a monopoly. Like other monopolies it is open to many objections- it
burdens both competitors and the public. Unlike most other monopolies, the law
permits and even encourages it because of its peculiar great advantages. Still,
remembering that it is a monopoly, we must be sure that the burdens do not
outweigh the benefits. So it becomes desirable for us to examine who is benefitted
and how much and at whose expense.
See Zechariah Chafee, Reflections on the Lmv of Copyright, 145 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 504 (1945).
281. See Litman, supra note 232.
282. See Tasini v. New York Times, 981 F. Supp. 841 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); see also Jane C. Ginsburg,
Authors as "Licensors "of "Informational Rights" Under U.C.C. Article 2B, 13 BERKELEYTECH. L.J. 945,
965-70 (1998) (discussing Article 2B rules that possibly increase author vulnerability to exploiters of
copyrighted works).
283. See WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra notel4.
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objective is greater levels of creativity, and not creativity-no matter how
great-by a select few. As a result, the copyright system had deliberate "leaks"
to ensure that, as a whole, the means properly balanced out the objectives.2
One potential impact of plugging up the leaks through greater protection is a
loss in the amount of works actually created, not an increase.
Clearly, the question of public welfare involves more than just the
production of works of authorship. It involves terms of access as well as costs
of access. In this sense, heightened protection in the form of the DMCA, for
example, is a countervailing force to productivity in the global economy. In
addition to the effect of recent statutes, there are daily reports of small
entrepreneurs on the Internet who are strangled by copyright owners to the
point that they are unable to remain active in this new space for economic
activity. There are daily incidents of global businesses on computer websites
that are threatened with lawsuits, or shut down technologically by service
providers, on grounds that copyright owners complained of infringement.28
Public welfare is no longer policed as an objective of copyright but is now the
subject of the global author's technological autonomy and the rules of the
copyright kingdom.
CONCLUSION
Greater economic integration on a global basis represents a paradox for
countries seeking hegemonic presence in the global market. The international
trade regime minimizes the prospects of utilizing policies to favor domestic
industry.2"6 By adding to the international trade regime a system boasting of
minimum, uniform requirements that heighten intellectual property protection,
the United States effectively, if unintentionally, inextricably bound its
domestic welfare to global welfare. Put differently, under a system that
provides minimum standards of protection and precludes discrimination in
favor of domestic firms, the United States, and other countries, have severely
constrained the scope of government use of policy to effectuate stated
domestic welfare goals. In a world where boundaries are firm (or relevant),
it is possible, at least in theory, to distinguish between domestic and
284. See Mark Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy ofIntellectual Property Licensing,
87 CAL. L. REV. 111 (1999).
285. See, e.g., Carl S. Kaplan, Is Linking Always Legal? The Experts Aren't Sure (visited Oct. 13,
1999) <http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/99/08/cybercyberlaw/O6law.html>.
286. See e.g., Weinstock, supra note 221; see also Reichman & Lange, supra note 3, at 25.
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international concerns, and to adopt policies that promote the former over the
latter. This efficacy is not easily managed in an integrated global economy.
It is a tacit but powerful submission to globalization, something the United
States would never expressly cede to, but which it has nevertheless adopted
by its insistence on expansive, global intellectual property rights.
Some scholars have argued that globalization, because of its territorial
seamlessness, has the potential, even if just minimally, to stabilize and
improve living conditions all over the world. 87 The asserted prospects for
gain are far ranging. For example, with specific regards to India, Brazil, and
other developing countries, one author concludes that there is gradual success
"in reaping the fruits of the deeper relations they are establishing with the rest
of the world" despite the costs they have had to pay. According to this school
of thought, the policy choices of national governments to refrain from "top-
down" regulation of information technologies such as the Internet 288-or to at
least keep such regulation at a minimum-coupled with the practical limitations
of overseeing millions of users and their various activities in cyberspace, have
positive externalities." 9  These externalities include: a potential
democratizing effect in repressive regimes, particularly with regards to the
globalization of information;"9 greater economic gains from avoiding some
artificial barriers in international trade through the globalization of
commerce,29' including electronic commerce; and strategic gains in areas such
as public health, resulting from a concerted multinational effort to deal with
infectious diseases.2
The social manifestations of globalization cannot, however, obscure its
fundamentally economic and, ultimately, political character. While enabling
the maximization of human and capital resources, globalization is also
redefining economic status.2 93  There is little debate as to whether
287. See H.E. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Social Consequences of Globalization: Marginalization
or Improvement (visited Oct. 13, 1999) <http://www.brasil.emb.nw.dc.us/ fpst06gl.htm> (arguing "[i]t is
true that globalization has produced a window of opportunity for more countries to join the mainstream of
the world economy").
288. See id.
289. See id.
290. See id.
291. See id.
292. See David P. Fidler, The Globalization of Public Health: Emerging Infectious Diseases and
International Relations, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. II, 15 n. 13 (1997).
293. See, e.g., [AN CLARK, GLOBALIZATION AND FRAGMENTATION 6 (1997) (defining globalization as
"a broad process of restructuring state and civil society").
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globalization has the potential to increase welfare gains; liberal economic
scholarship assumes increased welfare as a given. 2' Rather, the debate is
centered on whether such gains are an inevitable result of globalization, or
whether gains are effectively secured only by adopting rules that address
evidences of international market failure and other imbalances in the
international trade system.295 The debate is a pivotal one for the regulation of
information technologies, as such technology is viewed both as a cause and
effect of globalization.
Historically, marginalization has referred to economically underdeveloped
countries, racial and ethnic minorities, women in patriarchal societies, the
population of impoverished inner cities, and others who are systematically
denied access to economic resources or otherwise excluded from enjoying the
full benefits of membership in a political economy. Today, the concept of
marginalization should be expanded to include disparate numbers of
individuals across racial, class, gender, and national boundaries who are
excluded from the "information superhighway." This exclusion is effected
either directly, through lack of access to computers, or indirectly in the form
of technological and/or legal restrictions to use of informational content such
as copyright law. There is a burgeoning body of literature that examines the
implications of the gap in the United States between the technological "haves"
and the "have-nots." Government concern over the ramifications of the
technological divide has spawned policy initiatives from federal, state, and
local governments in a concerted effort to ensure that, at least domestically,
a new type of economic dislocation is not engendered. However, none of
these initiatives involve reforming copyright law in favor of users. To the
contrary, as resources are expended on providing computer access in schools
and equipping citizens to effectively utilize the unprecedented amounts of
information available on-line, the U.S. Congress has passed several bills
providing even more significant control to copyright owners over the mass of
information available in cyberspace. Why provide direct access if copyright
294. See e.g, Anne Krueger, Global Trade Prospects for Developing Countries, 15 WORLD ECON.
457-74, (1992); DEEPAK LAL, A LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY SYSTEM AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1980).
295. See BHAGWATI, supra note 44; see also BHAGWATI, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AT RISK
(1993) (suggesting an international consensus on artificial advantages in high-tech industries to supplement
the world trade system). Bhagwati emphasizes the importance of a multilateral context, such as the GATT,
as a preferable means of redressing imbalances in free trade in high-tech goods that result from artificial
support. See id at 44-47.
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laws may operate to preclude, in whole or in part, the full benefits of
information technology? Do these policy initiatives lead to the same
purported objective, namely, the promotion of public welfare?
Throughout this Article, I have used the United States as my point of
focus in discussing the welfare implications of heightened and integrated
global rules for intellectual property protection. I have done so not only
because the United States led the international efforts to heighten and
integrate intellectual property, but because more than any other developed
country, the United States has had a long, rich history of express utilization of
intellectual property for the promotion of the public good. While what
constitutes the public good may be contested, what is clear from recent
legislation is that protection is increasingly weighted in favor of the economic
interests of owners. This will require government intervention to counteract
the effects of this protectionism on the marginalized sectors of society, and to
ensure that heightened protection does not continue to enlarge the numbers of
those who are marginalized. To the extent that those who are most adversely
affected are the poor, uneducated, non-English speaking, women, and the
elderly, the negative welfare effects will be felt disproportionately in least-
developed and developing countries. As a result, globalization is unlikely to
significantly ameliorate living conditions in these parts of the world (and
within those sectors of the U.S. society), neither will it alter the pattern and
structure of international economic relations that has existed since the age of
empire." The welfare concerns of domestic copyright law are not consistent
with the liberal trade model. Thus, as a theoretical matter, the trade-based
justification for copyright law is unpersuasive. Public welfare remains a
primary responsibility of the political State notwithstanding the pressures of
globalization. It is a responsibility developing countries must not abandon,
and that the United States should once again undertake to pursue within the
specific context of intellectual property policy.
Of course, the TRIPS Agreement imposes significant limitations ol what
can be done directly to alleviate domestic effects of compliance with its terms.
296. Historian Eric Hobsbawm described the l9th century as the Age of Empire. See ERIC HOBSBAWN,
THE AGE OF EMPIRE: 1875-1914 (1987). This was an epoch characterized by widespread political and
economic conquest of non-European peoples. Despite the wave of political independence that swept
through much of Africa and Asia in the early twentieth century, the colonial policies that were set in place
continued to exert a powerful influence over the structure of international economic relations, with
developing countries remaining at the periphery of the "community of States."
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In this sense, it appears that the continental countries which, according to their
intellectual property philosophy, have had little or no exceptions to the rights
granted authors, have gained much ground in the historical battle between the
droit d'auteur systems and the utilitarian copyright system of the United
States. Ifthe United States ever recognizes the implications for welfare within
its own borders, it may lead to a less stringent application of TRIPS where
legitimate national interests have been demonstrated. In any event, the
discussion leads to several conclusions for developing countries.
First, developing countries must avoid extreme protectionist measures
evident in developed country legislation implementing TRIPS and other
international agreements. Second, each country must outline an industrial
policy that is effectively coordinated with related macroeconomic policies,
particularly education and science policies. Education is critical for building
the nation's capacity to absorb, utilize, and adapt innovation to local needs.
Third, developing countries must maximize the opportunities available under
the TRIPS Agreement to tailor domestic intellectual property laws to their
domestic circumstances. Further, models of public-private initiatives recently
advocated by scholars29 should prove valuable for accessing innovation for
specific industries identified as strategic to development of the country's
industrial base. Above all, developing countries must address issues
fundamental to economic growth such as strong government and political
stability. Only in such an environment can domestic innovation flourish as
individuals are enabled to identify and utilize resources and skills to meet
specific development needs. Ultimately, nothing will have as significant an
impact on global welfare as a dramatically improved economic viability of
developing and least-developed countries.
For those at the margins, access to information and its associated
technologies is both an economic and a social concern; restrictions to access
undermine welfare at all levels, and further marginalize those who are not
owners of the global economy's primary resources. 9 " Both technologically
and legally, copyright owners control the terms of participation in the global
economy. Public welfare has been subordinated to the idiosyncrasies
of the global owner of intellectual property. Consequently, even
though globalization minimizes the role of States, the effects of
297. See Reichman & Lange, supra note 3.
298. See Litman, supra note 232.
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globalization-increasing the size and exacerbating the conditions of the
margins-make State involvement an imperative.

